Impact of transaction costs on Saskatchewan's beef finishing sector by Ayars, Morley Bryce
 IMPACT OF TRANSACTION COSTS 
ON SASKATCHEWAN’S 
BEEF FINISHING SECTOR 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of 
Graduate Studies and Research 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
For the Degree of Masters of Science 
In the 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan 
By 
Morley Bryce Ayars 
 
 
 
 
 
©Copyright Morley Bryce Ayars, June 2003. All rights reserved
 i 
Permission to Use 
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a 
Postgraduate degree from the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries of 
this University may make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that 
permission for copying of this thesis in any manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly 
purposes may be granted by the professor or professors who supervised my thesis work 
or, in their absence, by the Head of the Department or the Dean of the College in which 
my thesis work was done. It is understood that any copying or publication or use of this 
thesis or parts thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written 
permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the 
University of Saskatchewan in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in 
my thesis.  
            Requests for permission to copy or to make other use of material in this thesis in 
whole or part should be addressed to:  
             
Department Head 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan 
S7N 5A8 
ii 
 
Abstract 
 
Ayars, M.A., M.Sc., University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, June 2003.  
Impact of Transaction Costs on Saskatchewans Beef Finishing Sector, Supervisor: 
Andrew Schmitz. 
 
The removal of the transportation subsidy on western Canadian grain has 
resulted in a relative shift in competitiveness from grain to livestock production in 
Saskatchewan.  Feedlot managers indicated that they fed cattle at a lower cost than their 
Alberta competitors.  They suggested their feeding advantage is in the range of $45 to 
$75 per animal.  Yet this supposed feeding advantage has not resulted in an increase in 
cattle being finished in the province.  In fact statistics show that there has been a 
decrease in the number of cattle finished in Saskatchewan since the removal of the 
transportation subsidy. 
This thesis investigated potential hindrances to developing feedlots in 
Saskatchewan. Interviews with 17 Saskatchewan feedlot managers were conducted in 
2001. These feedlot managers suggested that lack of financing was a hindrance to 
feedlot development in Saskatchewan.  They sited provincial land and labour laws, a 
grain production bias and feeding risk as potential reasons for lack of investment in the 
feedlot sector. 
The interviews with these 17 feedlot managers led to an investigation of 
transaction costs in buying and selling cattle. A theoretical framework was developed in 
this thesis to measure transaction costs. Then some empirical evidence was calculated 
from transaction cost estimates provided by five finishing feedlots that indicated larger 
feedlots have lower transaction costs in buying and selling cattle than smaller feedlots. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
  
Vernon Fowke in his book The National Policy and the Wheat Economy 
outlines the development of the Canadian national policy towards wheat production.  
No other province bought into the wheat vision like Saskatchewan which has millions 
of acres of fertile land that is well suited for wheat production.  Figure 1.1 shows the 
percent of total farm cash receipts of Saskatchewan farms.  In 1970 about half of 
Saskatchewans farm cash receipts came from the sale of wheat and durum.  This 
increased to 65 percent by 1981 and has since decreased to less than 30 percent of farm 
cash receipts.   
 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Year
Wheat & Durum
All crops
Beef
All Livestock
 
 Figure 1.1: Percentage of Saskatchewan’s Total Farm Cash Receipts (1970-
          2000) 
Source: Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization Statistical Handbook for various years 
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 Although wheat and durum has become less important to Saskatchewans farm 
cash receipts total crop receipts are still important.  Total crop receipts have remained 
relatively constant between 60 and 80 percent of farm cash receipts.  But income from 
beef animal sales dropped from about 20 percent in 1970 to 11 percent in 1983.  Since 
1983 cash receipts from beef animals has gradually returned to 1970 levels.  Cash 
receipts from all livestock dropped from about one-third of cash receipts to less than 20 
percent in the 1980s and have returned to about one-quarter of farm cash receipts.  
Much of the latest increase in livestock receipts has offset the reduction in government 
program payments that occurred during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Figure 1.2 shows a much different story for Alberta.  In 1970 cash receipts from 
sales of livestock were about equal to those from crop sales.  However, cash receipts 
from livestock have gradually increased until they account for nearly two-thirds of 
Albertas farm cash receipts. 
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 Figure 1.2: Percentage of Alberta’s Total Farm Cash Receipts (1986-2000) 
Source: Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization Statistical Handbook for various years 
 
In 1970 Albertas farm cash receipts were less than Saskatchewans.  Figure 1.3 
shows the percentage of Albertas and Saskatchewans farm cash receipts as a 
percentage of Canadian farm cash receipts.  Alberta gradually has increased its farm 
3 
cash receipts relative to Saskatchewan such that it now has significantly higher farm 
cash receipts.  If one was to take into account value added from livestock processing in 
Alberta compared to Saskatchewans grain exports the impact on the provincial 
economy would probably be more dramatic. 
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 Figure 1.3: Alberta & Saskatchewan Farm Cash Receipts as a Percentage  
               of Canadian Farm Cash Receipts (1986-2000) 
Source: Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization Statistical Handbook for various years 
 
 
Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization1 is now encouraging 
greater livestock production.  The thrust is towards developing both the hog and beef 
industries within the province in order to add value to grain production.  In terms of 
beef production the department is now encouraging feedlot development. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
 
In 1995 the federal government removed the transportation subsidy on grain in 
western Canada.  This resulted in a shift in the competitiveness of the grain industry 
                                                 
1 Saskatchewan Agriculture was renamed to Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food because the department 
was given responsibility to develop added value industries in food processing.  Later the department was 
renamed to Saskatchewan, Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization to reflect its added role in 
economic development in rural Saskatchewan. 
4 
relative to the livestock industry.  It also resulted in a shift in the relative 
competitiveness of Saskatchewans livestock industry with that of Albertas.  Since 
1995, Saskatchewan has had a cost of feeding advantage over Alberta.  The U.S 
International Trade Commission (1999) examined the cost of feeding cattle in western 
Canadian feedlots in the R-Calf antidumping challenge to Canadian live cattle exports 
into the United States.  The Commission found that Pound-Maker feedlot, the only 
Saskatchewan feedlot in the study, would not have been countervailed because it was 
not selling into the U.S. market below its cost of production.  All other Alberta feedlots 
were found to be selling below their cost of production.  The Commission estimated 
that Pound-Maker had about $50 per animal lower cost of production than the other 
feedlots in the study. Saskatchewan feedlot managers suggest that their feeding 
advantage is between $45 and $75 per animal.   Yet there has not been a shift in the 
number of beef animals finished in Saskatchewan.  In fact there has been a slight 
decline in the number of beef animals finished in Saskatchewan since 1995. So why are 
less than 200,000 slaughter steers and heifers finished in Saskatchewan when the 
province produces over a million head of beef cattle calves?  Saskatchewan has fewer 
large feedlots than Alberta. Does the lack of large feedlots result in lower prices being 
paid to Saskatchewan feedlots thereby making them less economical? Could transaction 
cost analysis provide part of the answer to these questions? 
 
1.3 Hypothesis 
 
The primary hypothesis is that large finishing feedlots have an economic 
advantage in the purchase and sale of cattle due to transaction costs compared to smaller 
5 
feedlots. This hypothesis implies that large finishing feedlots receive an economically 
significant higher price for their slaughter cattle than small finishing feedlots and that 
they have an economically significant lower cost in purchasing feeder cattle than 
smaller finishing feedlots. 
 
1.4 Objective of the Thesis 
 
The objective of this thesis is three fold.  The first goal is to provide an 
understanding of how feeder cattle are marketed in Saskatchewan.  The second is to 
analyze the impact of transaction costs on the potential expansion of the feedlot sector 
and in particular the finishing feedlot sector. A theoretical model will be developed that 
combines neoclassical economic theory with transaction cost economic theory. This 
theoretical model will provide the backbone for the analysis of the hypothesis.  The 
final objective is to provide a quantitative analysis of the hypothesized transaction cost 
advantage of larger finishing feedlots in the purchase of feeder cattle and sale of 
slaughter cattle. 
 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 2 will give an overview of the Saskatchewan feeding sector.  It will 
outline the physical structure of the beef industry followed by its market structure.  This 
chapter will also summarize the results of a survey of 17 feedlot managers in order to 
gain their opinions regarding the expansion of the feedlot sector. 
6 
 
 The literature review is outlined in chapter 3.  Here an overview of the literature 
that describes the development of the western Canadian beef industry will be provided. 
The theoretical literature on transaction cost economics will be outlined followed by an 
overview of the literature on measuring transaction costs.  
 The theoretical framework will be developed in chapter 4.  Here the thesis will 
show that through transaction cost theory it is possible for large feedlots to receive 
higher prices for the cattle they sell and pay lower prices for the cattle they purchase 
without the existence of market power.  
 Chapters 5 and 6 are the empirical methodology and conclusion respectively.  
The empirical framework will outline the method of data collection and its subsequent 
analysis.  
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Chapter 2 
Background 
 
This chapter will provide an overview of the Saskatchewan beef industry with 
particular attention given to Saskatchewans beef feeding sector.  In addition the 
vertical physical structure of the Saskatchewan beef industry will be described along 
with a description of its vertical market structure.  The demographics of Saskatchewan 
feedlots will be given as well as the results of a survey of 17 Saskatchewan feedlot 
managers in regards to their opinions on expanding Saskatchewans feedlot sector.  The 
information gained in these interviews led to the decision to examine the impact of 
transaction costs on buying and selling cattle.   
 
2.1 Overview of Saskatchewan’s Beef Industry 
 
This section is to provide an overview on Saskatchewan beef cattle industry. 
This section will include comparisons between the beef cattle industries in Alberta and 
Saskatchewan.  It will further provide the destinations of Saskatchewans beef cattle 
production. Saskatchewan had 1.13 million beef cows as of July 1, 2002.  This is an 
increase from 1986 but slightly below the 1997 high of 1.15 million head.  Figure 2.1 
gives the Saskatchewan beef cow numbers from 1986 to 2000. 
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Figure 2.1 Saskatchewan Beef Cow Numbers (1986-2000) 
Source:  Saskatchewan Agriculture and Foods Agriculture Statistics Handbook, 2000 
 
Table 2.1 shows that Saskatchewan had 26 percent of Canadas beef calf 
production, in 2001, second only to Albertas 40 percent.  However, in 1999, 
Saskatchewan had only six percent of the Canadian fed cattle production compared to 
Albertas 69 percent as shown in Table 2.2.  Yet Saskatchewan produced 5.5 million 
tonnes of barley in 2000, much of which went to Alberta feedlots. 
 
Table 2.1 Beef Cow Numbers in Saskatchewan and Alberta Relative to Canada 
      (1999-2001) 
 
    % of Can.   % of Can.   
  Sask.   Alta.   Canada 
  Million Head   Million Head   Million Head
Jan 1 1999 1.122 27% 1.657 40% 4.189
Jan 1 2000 1.064 26% 1.655 40% 4.137
Jan 1 2001 1.090 26% 1.673 40% 4.206 
Source: Mike Pylypchuk (2000), SAF, originally from Statistics Canada  
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Table 2.2: Fed Cattle Production in Saskatchewan and Alberta in Relation to 
       Canadian Production (1986 – 1999) 
YEAR SASK. 
% of 
Can. ALBERTA % of Can. CANADA 
  1000 head 
1986 288 12% 1052.1 44% 2394.9 
1987 307 14% 1066.9 48% 2240.0 
1988 309 13% 1163.8 49% 2355.0 
1989 279 12% 1229.1 51% 2395.0 
1990 269 11% 1316.9 56% 2366.8 
1991 254 12% 1254.2 58% 2170.5 
1992 217 8% 1526.5 59% 2586.6 
1993 225 9% 1619.2 62% 2612.2 
1994 253 9% 1725.2 64% 2707.4 
1995 357 12% 1838.2 64% 2877.7 
1996 297 9% 2113.5 66% 3184.7 
1997 280 9% 2179.8 67% 3265.0 
1998 219 6% 2392.3 69% 3474.4 
1999 196 6% 2409.8 69% 3478.1 
   
Source:  Mike Pylypchuck (2000), SAF, originally compiled form Statistics Canada, CBGA, AAFC, 
 CanFax 
 
 
Figure 2.2 shows that Saskatchewan retained about 29 percent of its feeder 
steers and heifers in 2001 compared to 1987 when the province retained nearly 55 
percent of its feeder steers and heifers.  In 2001, Saskatchewan retained 27 percent of its 
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Figure 2.2: Saskatchewan’s Feeder Cattle Retention Rate (1976-2001) 
Source:  Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalizations Cattle Marketing Report 
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feeder steers and 31 percent of its feeder heifers.  The trend toward decreasing retention 
began in 1988 and continued throughout the 1990s.   
In 2001, Saskatchewan marketed 1.118 million feeder steers and heifers.  
Provincial marketings of feeder steers totaled 629,550 head and 488,850 feeder heifers. 
Marketing of feeder steers consisted of 239,570 under 600 pound calves, 218,560 
animals that were 600 to 800 pounds and 171,420 over 800 pound animals.  There were 
181,540 head of over 700 pounds feeder heifers sold, 199,310 feeder heifers sold that 
were between 500 and 700 pounds and 108,000 under 500 pounds feeder heifers 
marketed. 
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the retention rate of Saskatchewan feeder steer and 
heifer marketings by weight category. The remaining animals were exported out of the 
province.  In 2001, Saskatchewan kept 91,190 steer calves and 45,470 feeder heifer  
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 Figure 2.3: Saskatchewan’s Feeder Steer Retention Rate (1976-2001) 
Source:  Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalizations Cattle Marketing Report 
 
calves.  The province retained 58,350 of the 600 to 800 pound steers and 69,150 of the 
500 to 700 pound feeder heifers.  Only 18,840 over 800 pound steers and 35,970 over 
700 pound feeder heifers were fed in the province. There has been a gradual decline in 
the number of animals kept for feeding in Saskatchewan since 1987. 
11 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
>700 lbs
Heifers
5-700 lbs
Heifers
<500 lbs
Heifers
 Figure 2.4: Saskatchewan’s Feeder Heifer Retention Rate (1976-2001) 
Source:  Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalizations Cattle Marketing Report  
 
Figure 2.5 shows Saskatchewan feeder cattle exports.  Exports to the United 
States started to decline in the early 1980s and continued to decline throughout the 
period from1980 to 2001.  However, Saskatchewan exports of feeder cattle increased 
into Alberta during the same period.  Alberta replaced the United States as the primary 
destination of Saskatchewan feeder cattle in the early 1980s. Saskatchewan feeder  
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Figure 2.5: Destinations of Saskatchewan Feeder Cattle Exports (1976-
2001) 
Source:  Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalizations Cattle Marketing Report. 
 
 
cattle exports continued to increase into Alberta throughout the 1990s.  In 2001, 
Saskatchewan exported 570,420 feeder cattle into Alberta, while it exported 56,500 
feeder cattle into the United States.  Ontario replaced the United States as the second 
12 
largest importer of Saskatchewan feeder cattle in the late 1990s with Ontario receiving 
115,490 head in 2001. 
 The increase in exports of feeder cattle into Alberta came mainly through 
increased exports of feeder heifers and steers as indicated in Figure 2.6.  In 2001, 
Saskatchewan exported 565,370 feeder heifers and steers into Alberta of which 307,080 
were steers.  Saskatchewans increase in feeder cattle exports into Alberta coincided 
with the increase in the Alberta feeding industry, which began in the 1960s and 
continued to grow throughout the 1990s.  Ramsay (2000) states that by 1987, Alberta 
produced 1.1 million head of slaughter cattle or about 48 percent of Canadian 
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Figure 2.6: Saskatchewan Feeder Exports to Alberta (1976-2001) 
Source:  Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalizations Cattle Marketing Report  
 
production. Alberta continued to increase fed cattle production to where it produced 2.4 
million head of slaughter cattle by 1999. 
Albertas increase in slaughter cattle production has occurred simultaneously 
with its increase in slaughtering capacity.  Alberta slaughtered 1.796 million head in 
1996 or about 46 percent of Canadian capacity.  Canfax (2002) reported that Alberta 
slaughtered 2.534 million head in 2001 and had about 63 percent of the Canadian 
slaughter capacity.   Albertas increase in slaughter capacity coincides with the 
13 
development of two world-class slaughter facilities at High River and Brooks.  These 
plants each slaughtered about 4,000 head per day. 
In contrast, Saskatchewans slaughter cattle production has decreased from a 
high of 721,700 head in 1984 to 279,100 head in 2000 and increased slightly to 342,560 
in 2001 as illustrated in Figure 2.7.  Decreased slaughter cattle production resulted in 
decreased slaughter cattle exports.  Saskatchewan exports of slaughter cattle decreased 
from a high of 449,940 in 1984 to 129,270 in 2000 and increased slightly to 183,590 in  
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Figure 2.7: Destination of Saskatchewan Slaughter Cattle (1982-2001) 
Source:  Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalizations Cattle Marketing Report  
 
2001.  Domestic slaughter cattle use dropped from a high of 274,440 in 1984 to 149,830 
in 2000 and in 2001 increased to 158,970. By 2001, Saskatchewan slaughtered about 46 
percent of the provincial slaughter cattle production. 
In 2000, the majority of cattle slaughtered in Saskatchewan took place at the XL 
Beef plant in Moose Jaw.  This plant went through an expansion that brought its 
capacity to 725 animals per day.  The kill is constrained by the cooling capacity of the 
plant.  They have sufficient labour to kill more animals during the one shift they run at 
the plant. Therefore, this plant could easily more than double its killing capacity by 
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increasing its cooling capacity.  The Moose Jaw plant kills about 55 percent cows and 
about 45 percent fat cattle1.   
Figure 2.8 provides Saskatchewan cattle slaughters from 1987 to 2001.  The 
decrease in the number of cattle slaughtered in Saskatchewan is primarily due to the 
decrease in the number of steers slaughtered.  By 2001, Saskatchewan slaughtered 
51,450 steers, 25,170 heifers, 78,460 cows and 3,830 bulls. 
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Figure 2.8: Saskatchewan Cattle Slaughters (1987-2001) 
Source:  Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalizations Cattle Marketing Report  
 
The United States was the primary destination for slaughter cattle exports during 
the 1990s.  Manitoba was the primary destination of Saskatchewan slaughter cattle 
exports during the 1980s until the United States took over in 1990 as Figure 2.9 
illustrates. In the early 1990s Manitoba was replaced by Alberta as the second most 
common destination for Saskatchewan slaughter cattle exports.  
                                                 
1 Fat cattle is an industry term for slaughter steers and heifers that generally weigh between 1,300 and 
1,400 pounds live weight.  
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Figure 2.9: Saskatchewan Slaughter Cattle Export Destinations (1982-2001) 
Source:  Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalizations Cattle Marketing Report  
 
In 1982, Saskatchewan exported 123,770 slaughter animals to Manitoba by 2001 
exports had dropped to 13,920 head.  Exports of slaughter animals to the United States 
reached a high of 143,490 head in 1993 and have dropped until exports into the United 
States and Alberta were virtually equal in 1999 and 2000.  By 2001, the United States 
once again became Saskatchewans primary market for slaughter cattle. That year 
Saskatchewan exported 63,530 slaughter cattle into Alberta and 97,450 into the United 
States. 
Figures 2.10 and 2.11 illustrate the composition of slaughter cattle exports into 
Alberta and the United States respectively.  Exports of slaughter steers, heifers and 
cows have generally increased into Alberta from 1992.  The main difference in the 
composition of cattle exported to Alberta and the United States was that the United 
States imports significantly more slaughter bulls.  In 2001, the United States imported 
18,060 slaughter bulls while Alberta took only 1,110 slaughter bulls from 
Saskatchewan. Provincial exports into the United States during 2001 were further 
comprised of 30,560 slaughter steers, 10,480 slaughter heifers and 38,350 slaughter 
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cows, while Alberta received 23,980 slaughter steers, 16,490 slaughter heifers and 
21,390 slaughter cows. 
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 Figure 2.10: Saskatchewan Slaughter Cattle Exports to Alberta (1987-2001) 
Source:  Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalizations Cattle Marketing Report  
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 Figure2.11: Saskatchewan Slaughter Cattle Exports to US. (1987-2001) 
Source:  Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalizations Cattle Marketing Report  
 
Saskatchewan produces both barley and beef cattle calves.  Yet it has continued 
to lose ground to Alberta in fed cattle production. 
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2.2 Beef Industry Physical Structure 
 
The physical flow and transformation of cattle in the Saskatchewan beef 
industry, as illustrated in Figure 2.12, consists of several stages, beginning with cow-
calf production and ending at the consumers plate.  The intermediate stages include 
backgrounding operations, finishing feedlots, packing plants (slaughter houses), 
processors, wholesalers, and retailers. 
Cow-calf producer
Backgrounder
Feedlot
Packer
Processor
WholesalerRetailer
Consumer
BEEF PRODUCTION FLOW CHART
  
Figure 2.12 Vertical Physical Structure of the Beef Industry 
 
The cow-calf producer supplies calves for either the backgrounder or finishing 
feedlot.  Generally, calves are born between early January and mid-June and then 
weaned in late September to early November.  Weaned calves typically vary in weight 
from 150 kg to 375 kg live weight. The larger framed calves enter directly into the 
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feedlot where they receive a high-energy diet until they are slaughtered, usually at 12 to 
14 months. The remaining calves are backgrounded during the winter.  These calves are 
usually put in a dry lot and fed a high roughage ration.  Those calves that are not ready 
for finishing in the spring are usually placed on grass until they are ready for the 
finishing feedlot.  The backgrounding process takes between 100 to 150 days. After 
backgrounding, the animals that are about 370 kg (800 lbs.) enter into a finishing 
feedlot where they receive a high-energy ration and are soon ready for slaughter.  
Smaller framed calves require 18 to 24 months from birth to slaughter while medium 
framed calves require 14 to 18 months.  Finishing feedlots are able to feed weaned 
calves through to slaughter, but prefer to purchase backgrounded animals that already 
have a frame size that enables them to quickly gain weight.  Purchasing backgrounded 
animals reduces the number of sick animals, reduces the amount of rations required, and 
increases the number of turnovers in a year, thereby increasing the efficiency of the 
finishing feedlot. 
Feedlots supply fat cattle to the packing plant where they are slaughtered.  
Carcasses are then graded and processed, usually into a boxed beef form.  This beef is 
then sold to the final consumer, processor, wholesaler or retailer.  Packing plants may 
be vertically integrated into secondary processing and/or sell to firms who do secondary 
processing.  Secondary processing is referred to as processors in figure 2.12. Secondary 
processing includes making products such as sausage, beef jerky and ready-to-eat 
meals.  Processors may sell to the final consumer, wholesaler, or retailer.  For example 
many sausage makers sell their product directly to the final consumer. Wholesalers 
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usually perform a search-and-gather function for small retail outlets such as small 
restaurants and stores, while retailers sell meat products directly to final consumers. 
To this point the physical structure of the beef industry has been outlined.  The 
interaction in the market place between each phase remains to be discussed.   
 
2.3 Structure of the Beef Marketing System  
 
This section outlines the interaction between feedlots, cow-calf producers and 
packing plants. Figure 2.13 below is a schematic of this interaction. 
 
Figure 2.13:  Vertical Market Structure of the Beef Industry  
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Order Buyers (depicted as OB in figure 2.13) are key middlemen in marketing 
beef cattle.  Order buyers or cattle brokers provide many services to the beef industry.  
They buy and sell cattle on behalf of customers, provide financing for the purchase of 
cattle, act as an impartial evaluator in direct sales and provide a source of information 
on local markets.  They are required under the regulations of Saskatchewans The 
Animal Products Act to be licensed and bonded.  Bonding and licensing costs about 
$700 annually. 
Feedlots either contact the order buyer or the order buyer contacts the feedlot 
regarding cattle markets.  Order Buyers purchase cattle for specific orders or may buy 
on speculation. 
Generally, an order is placed with the order buyer specifying the type of animal 
the feedlot wants and the amount of money they are willing to pay.  The buyer tries to 
fill the order and charges the current commission of $1.00 per hundred-weight for this 
service.   
The order buyer is liable for paying for the animals that they purchase at the 
auction markets.  They have a window of three days before payment is required.  
During this three-day period they normally ship the cattle to their client and receive 
payment. 
There are a number of cattle broker firms in Saskatchewan.  Some firms 
specialize in specific auction markets while others have buyers at all auction markets in 
the province.  Firms may employ as few as one buyer or have a large number of 
employees buying cattle.   
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Order buyers usually charge a lower commission when dealing among 
themselves.  They deal with each other when one cattle brokerage firm may have a large 
contract that can not be filled by themselves and have other order buyers help fill this 
order.  Another situation may be when they find themselves with a number of cattle that 
do not divide evenly into trucks.  In this case they may deal the cattle to other order 
buyers that need a few more cattle to fill their trucks. 
Reputation is a critical part of an order buyers business.  They need a reputation 
in judging the quality of cattle they are purchasing and a reputation of dealing fairly 
with their clients. Gaining a reputation is a long process usually by working for a cattle 
brokerage firm.  Once a reputation is gained then it is possible for order buyers to set up 
their own businesses assuming they are able to obtain sufficient financing.  Reputation 
is difficult to gain but easily lost. 
However it is becoming more difficult for small cattle brokerage firms to 
compete with large cattle brokerage firms.  The large firms are able to provide more 
services than smaller ones.  Larger firms are able to develop a larger network so they 
can often get better contracts with packing plants or with other feedlots, they are able to 
attend more auction markets meaning they have a wider range of cattle to access. They 
also often can provide better financing because they are able to obtain money at a lower 
cost.   Perillat, Ayars, Highmoor and Schmitz (2002) reported that four large cattle 
brokerage firms that operate in Saskatchewan obtain favourable financing through Farm 
Credit Canada, a federal crown corporation. Smaller cattle brokerage firms would find it 
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difficult to find similar financing through other financial institutions in order to 
compete.  
Cow-calf producers have the option to sell their weaned calves to an auction 
market sell direct to the feedlots or retain ownership of their calves.  The auction is 
usually pre-sort sale where animals of similar genetics, age and size are moved through 
an auction ring in combined lots.  The cattle are priced on the spot through a live 
interaction between buyer and seller.2 Discussions with personnel at Saskatchewan 
Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization and cow-calf producers suggest that 
between 75 and 90 percent of the calves marketed in Saskatchewan go through the 
auction market. The remaining calves are sold through some form of direct sales 
including satellite sales, e-mail and internet auction. Cow-calf producers can sell their 
calves directly to feedlots themselves or go through an order buyer.  In the case of 
retained ownership, cow-calf producers may either sell backgrounded animals to the 
finishing feedlot directly, through an order buyer or through the auction market. Further 
they can sell finished animals directly to the packing plant or through an order buyer.  
Discussions with a large Saskatchewan cow-calf producer that sells calves 
directly to feedlots suggest that with a little time and effort a cow-calf producer could 
gain $20 to $25 per animal through direct sales to a feedlot.  The primary costs incurred 
would be opportunity costs in time spent searching out potential buyers and price 
discovery as well as negotiating delivery and price options. One method cow-calf 
producers could search out potential buyers is by finding out who purchased their calves 
at the auction market. Then they could contact the buyers to see if any of the buyers 
wanted more of their cattle and if these buyers would buy directly from them.  Cow-calf 
                                                 
2 Unterschultz (2000) page 36. 
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producers could also use beef cattle magazines to find other potential buyers. Cow-calf 
producers could use order buyers as impartial sorters and evaluators and pay them a flat 
wage for their services. Any sales into the United States would also require the 
assistance of an order buyer because they are bonded. Direct marketers suggest the key 
to direct sales is never send bad cattle.   
Discussions with 17 Saskatchewan feedlot managers suggest they purchase 
about 80 percent of their feeder calves through auction markets.  The remaining calves 
are either purchased directly from cow-calf producers or produced as part of the feedlot 
operations. 
There are two types of feedlot operations in Saskatchewan, those that primarily 
background calves and those who primarily finish cattle for slaughter. About 18 percent 
of the 210 feedlots in Saskatchewan are primarily finishing feedlots that account for 
about 38 percent of the 201,000 head capacity in Saskatchewan.  The following section 
will provide a more detailed analysis of Saskatchewans feedlot sector. 
The type of marketing arrangement that feedlots have is determined by the 
frequency with which they buy and sell their animals.  Batch feedlots are defined in this 
thesis as those feedlots that fill their feedlot with the same type of animals during a 
three to six week period then sell all their animals as they become ready for sale until 
the feedlot is empty.  Then they start the cycle over with a maximum of two cycles per 
year. The majority of backgrounding feedlots fit in this category along with smaller 
finishing feedlots. Generally, this type of feedlot is more likely to have forward selling 
contracts either with finishing feedlots, order buyers or packing plants.   
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Continuous feedlots are defined in this thesis as those feedlots that buy and sell 
on a daily, weekly or monthly basis. This type of feedlot is seldom empty.  Their market 
strategy is to buy and sell during the same daily, weekly or monthly period and they do 
not usually forward contract the sales of their cattle.  Large finishing feedlots generally 
fit in this category. 
The marketing strategy chosen by the feedlot is based on the size of feedlot, 
willingness to take risk and the ability of the feedlot to access capital and conditions 
placed on the acquisition of this capital.  These conditions and ability to access capital is 
based upon the relative wealth of the feedlot and its management of the marketing 
process.  The feedlots wealth refers to its financial strength in terms of ownership of 
assets and the amount of financial backing it can access through shareholders.  
Backgrounding feedlots either custom feed for customers or take ownership of 
the calves during the backgrounding process.  Custom feeders include finishing 
feedlots, order buyers, cow-calf producers (usually through a feeder association), or 
other private investors. Backgrounding feedlot managers generally forward contract 
their animals with finishing feedlots or order buyers who have forward contracts with 
finishing feedlots. 
Finishing feedlots either custom feed for their customers or take ownership of 
the animals during the feeding process. They either contract their calves out to 
backgrounding dry lot, contract to be grassed during the summer or background and 
finish in their own lot.  Finishing feedlots have a similar custom feeder base as does 
backgrounding feedlots with the addition of packing plants. The majority of finishing 
feedlots in Saskatchewan market their slaughter cattle directly to the packing plants but 
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a few prefer to go through order buyers. Figure 2.14 shows that over 90 percent of 
slaughter steers are marketed directly to Saskatchewan packing plants while nearly 90 
percent of slaughter heifers are marketed in this manner in 2001. 
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Figure 2.14:  Percentage of Direct to Plant Marketings (Saskatchewan) 
Source:  Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalizations Cattle Marketing Report 
 
The majority of feedlot managers prefer to buy and sell during the same daily, 
weekly or monthly period.  They argue that feeding margins are small so custom 
feeding is relatively low risk with low profit margins.  They contend that it is more 
profitable buying and selling cattle than feeding cattle. However, the feedlot needs to 
have sufficient financial strength to ride though the down market in order to take 
advantage of an up market. 
Saskatchewan finishing feedlots sell slaughter cattle primarily to four Canadian 
packing plants and a few U.S. packing plants.  Unterschultz (2000) indicates that in 
1997 Excel (Cargill Foods) in High  River (Alberta), X-L Foods Ltd. in Calgary 
(Alberta), IBP (Lakeside Packers) in Brooks (Alberta) and Better Beef Limited in 
Guelph (Ontario) accounted for about 70 percent of federally inspected cattle slaughters 
in Canada.  Since then X-L Foods Ltd. bought and expanded the packing plant in Moose 
Jaw (Saskatchewan).   
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Many of the 17 feedlot managers indicated that they prefer to sell to Canadian 
packing plants rather than to U.S. packing plants.  They indicate that the U.S. grid 
system is more severe than the one offered by Canadian plants.  The U.S. grid has 
weight ranges built into the grid.  The discounts are severe if the animal weighs outside 
these ranges.  Those feedlots that sell into the United States prefer to sell based on live 
weight.   
Saskatchewan slaughter cattle marketed in Canada are priced either on live 
weight bases, rail grade or a formula price often referred to as the grid. Live bid is based 
on the sellers description of the cattle and packers bid with the highest bid getting the 
animals.  Some feedlots prefer to sell using the list system where the seller describes the 
animal and the price requested.  Usually packers will give a live or rail bid if they are 
not willing to take the price.  The feedlot then has the option to either take the highest 
bid or re-list at a lower price. Feedlot managers that use a list system indicate that the 
decision to take the highest packers bid or re-list is dependent on market conditions. 
Rail grade means that the price is based on the carcass weight and the grade3 of 
the animal. Packers bid based on a certain grade usually at the top Canadian grade.  
Animals that grade lower will receive a discounted price based on the market.  There 
may be further discounts if the animal is too large or too small. 
Formula or the grid system is a system of incentives and discounts and is 
generally offered to feedlots with which the packing plant has a strong business 
                                                 
3 Grading is done by the Canadian Beef Grading Agency, which provides third party grading of beef at 
federally and provincially inspected packing plants.  The packing plants pay for their services by 
negotiating a contract with the agency.  The agency then hires the graders to do the grading. The 
Canadian Beef Grading Agency is audited by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency at two levels.  First 
each grader is audited.  If they grade less than 95% accuracy but greater than 90% accuracy then they 
must go through retraining.  If they grade less than 90% accuracy then they are disqualified from grading. 
The Canadian Beef Grading Agency is also audited by Canadian Food Inspection Agency regarding its 
business practices.   
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relationship. The feedlot is required to provide a certain percentage of cattle in the top 
grades.  The packing plant determines if the animals reach that packing plants top 
grades.  These grades are higher than the top Canadian grade. Usually, if the animal 
does not meet the highest Canadian grade then the feedlot is paid on the rail grade 
method. If the feedlot does not meet the percentage of cattle at the required grade then 
there are severe discounts. The feedlot would also probably have higher costs in 
obtaining the premium prices offered. 
Unterschultz (2000) further indicates that the three Alberta plants purchased 
about two-thirds of their cattle, in 1998, through the spot market, 22 percent through 
contract or packer-owned fed cattle and 10 percent through formula or grid pricing. 
Discussions with Alberta packing plants suggest that little has changed since 
Unterschultzs study. They also indicated that they prefer to purchase rail grade on the 
spot market. Purchasing through a contract means the packing plant and feedlot 
negotiate the price for delivery at some future date. Usually the price is based on live or 
rail grade. Rail grade is the most common method of pricing under contract. 
 
2.4 Saskatchewan Feedlot Sector 
 
This section outlines the number, type and size of feedlots found throughout 
Saskatchewan. The Saskatchewan Agriculture and Foods 2000 Feedlot Survey 
indicated there were nearly 210 feedlots in Saskatchewan with a total one time feeding 
capacity of about 201,500 head.  About 22 percent of the feeding capacity existed in 
159 feedlots that have a one-time capacity of less than one thousand head.  It is 
28 
probable that most of these feedlots feed only during the winter. About 64 percent of 
these small feedlots backgrounded. Backgrounding represented about two-thirds of the 
one-time capacity in this size range.  About 23 percent did not indicate if they 
backgrounded or finished, which represented about 19 percent of the small feedlot 
categorys capacity. The remainder either finished or backgrounded and finished. 
In 2000, there were 41 feedlots that had a capacity from 1,000 head to 3,000 
head representing about 31 percent of Saskatchewans feeding capacity.   Within this 
category about 39 percent backgrounded, 22 percent finished, 32 percent both 
backgrounded and finished and the remainder did not indicate whether they 
backgrounded or finished. Backgrounding feedlots made up about 36 percent of the 
one-time capacity at this level, finishing feedlots made up about 26 percent and those 
who did both made up about 31 percent. 
The over 3,000 to 5,000 head one-time capacity category included 8 feedlots, 
which accounted for about 15 percent of provincial capacity. Two of these feedlots 
exclusively backgrounded, one exclusively finished while the rest did both.  About 44 
percent of this levels capacity was used for backgrounding and 56 percent for finishing. 
There were 6 feedlots that had a one-time capacity of greater than 5,000 head.  
This group accounted for 38 percent of provincial capacity.  Two feedlots exclusively 
finished while the rest backgrounded and finished.  About 70 percent of this categorys 
capacity was used for finishing and 30 percent for backgrounding. 
The big 6 feedlots made up over 55 percent of the provinces one-time 
finishing capacity and the top two categories accounted for over 75 percent of the 
finishing capacity.  Assuming the feedlots that had a one-time capacity of less than 
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3,000 head filled their lots only once a year further shows the dominance of the large 
feedlots in terms of finishing.  Under this assumption the top two categories accounted 
for nearly 85 percent of the animals finished with the big 6 accounting for about 65 
percent. 
Figure 2.15 illustrates the percentage of feedlots, total one-time capacity and 
one-time finishing capacity by feedlot category. 
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 Figure 2.15: Percent Feedlots, Total Capacity and Finishing Capacity by 
          Category (2000) 
Source: Compiled from Saskatchewan Agriculture & Foods 2000 Feedlot Survey 
 
 
Figure 2.16 gives the feeding capacity by crop district compiled from the 2000 
Feedlot Survey.  Crop districts 6A and 6B had 25 percent and 10 percent of the 
provincial feeding capacity respectively.  A close examination of the locations of the 
feedlots revealed that there were five major feedlots that were within 10 kilometres of 
the Yellow Head highway with a combined one-time capacity of about 63,000 head or 
about 31 percent of the provincial capacity.  There were 8 major feedlots within 110 
kilometres of the City of Saskatoon with a combined one-time capacity of 70,000 or 
about 35 percent of Saskatchewans capacity.   
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 Figure 2.16: Saskatchewan Feeding Capacity by Crop District - 2000 
Source: Compiled from Saskatchewan Agriculture & Foods 2000 Feedlot Survey. 
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2.5 Saskatchewan Feedlot Managers Reponses to Feedlot Development 
 
This section will provide a snap shot of the issues facing the feedlot sector in 
Saskatchewan and its possible expansion. A survey of 17 Saskatchewan feedlots was 
done in 2001 as part of the Assessment of Western Canadian Beef Development4 
project. These feedlots included backgrounding and finishing operations and included 
all feedlots with one-time capacities greater than 3,000 head.  Only two feedlots below 
3,000 head one-time capacity were surveyed with the smallest feedlot having a one-time 
capacity of 1,800 head.   
These feedlots accounted for about 57% of the total one-time capacity.  One 
feedlot expanded by 2,500 head in 2001. These 17 feedlots dedicated about 70,000 head 
of their total one-time capacity to finishing animals.  Saskatchewan Agriculture and 
Foods Cattle Marketing Report indicated that in the year 2000 Saskatchewan 
finished about 160,000 slaughter steers and heifers.  Therefore, these 17 feedlots 
accounted for nearly 90% of total provincial finishing capacity, assuming two turns per 
year.  Backgrounding accounted for about 46,000 head of the capacity of the 17 
feedlots.  This represents about 30% to 50% of the provincial backgrounding capacity 
depending on the number of turns the surveyed and non-surveyed lots had.  The 17 
feedlots were about evenly divided on the number of head that were owned compared to 
custom fed, with a slight edge to ownership. 
Feedlot managers were asked how they bought and sold cattle, how they 
obtained their feed requirement, how they dealt with risk, human resources, 
                                                 
4 A forthcoming report to Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization. [ Andrew Schmitz et 
al. (2003)] This study also relies on information gained from the Perillat et al. (2002) study. 
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management experience, and to identify hindrances to investment into the cattle feeding 
sector in Saskatchewan, the extent of entrepreneurial spirit in Rural Saskatchewan, 
community attitude towards intensive livestock operations, provincial infrastructure, 
perceptions of provincial government attitude towards the cattle feeding sector and the 
role of the provincial government in the beef industry. Appendix A provides the 
seed questions asked in the survey. Participants provide many responses to each 
question. 
Table 2.3 indicates the surveyed feedlots preferred method of obtaining their 
feeder cattle. Ninety-four percent of the feedlots surveyed bought feeder cattle through 
order buyers at auction markets. In total over 80 percent of the animals were purchased 
through auction markets and about 17 percent were purchased through direct sales. 
Table 2.3: Feedlot Preference in Acquiring Feeder Cattle: Saskatchewan  
     Percentage of Feedlots 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Auction Market   94.1%  
Direct Sales (local)   58.8%   
Own farm        5.9%   
Satellite auction       5.9% ______________________________  
 Source: Compiled from data provided by participants surveyed. 
 
 
Table 2.4 shows how these feedlots obtain the grain that goes into their feed 
rations.  This grain is mainly composed of barley but includes, distilled grain and 
screening pellets.  The feedlots were about evenly split in buying grain from grain 
brokers and local farmers, about 95 percent of the feedlots purchased grain in this 
manner. Other methods of obtaining grain include from the local elevator, from their 
own grain farm and from their shareholders.  About 7% of the grain used came from the 
feedlots grain enterprise.  Some feedlot managers did not have any trouble acquiring 
grain from local grain farmers while others complained that they were unable to 
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contract with farmers because the local grain farmers were unwilling to commit their 
grain. 
Table 2.4: Feedlot Grain Acquisition Preference: Saskatchewan    
     Percentage of Feedlots 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Local farmer or customer  47.1  
Grain Broker    47.1  
Own     29.4   
Elevator Company   23.5  
Shareholder      5.7_________________________________ 
 Source: Compiled from data provided by participants surveyed. 
 
Table 2.5 indicates that most feedlots prefer to grow their own roughage. This 
preference could be due to quality risk in obtaining roughage from other sources. 
Roughage consists mainly of silage with hay and straw supplemented occasionally. 
About 55 percent of the roughage used is grown on the feedlots own land and about 95 
percent of the remaining roughage is grown on land that is under contract to the feedlot 
either through shareholders or from local grain farmers. 
Table 2.5: How Feedlots Obtain Their Roughage: Saskatchewan  
 
Percentage of Feedlots 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Own     70.6  
Buy from local farmers  17.6  
Shareholders    11.8 ______________________________ 
 Source: Compiled from data provided by participants surveyed. 
 
Table 2.6 shows that nearly 30 percent of the 17 feedlots marketed at least some 
of their backgrounded cattle by contract.  About 18 percent of these feedlots marketed 
their backgrounded cattle at cost of gain plus a negotiated return to each feedlots fixed 
and management costs, through a bid system or on a straight price per pound of gain.  
Marketing through the auction market was not a method of choice for most feedlots. 
About 27 percent of the backgrounded cattle were sold by contract compared to 19 
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percent cost plus, 15 percent price per pound gain, 14 percent bid and 2 percent through 
the auction. 
Table 2.6: Feedlot Method of Marketing Backgrounders: Saskatchewan 
Percentage of Feedlots 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Contract    29.4    
Cost Plus    17.6  
Bid     17.6  
$/pound of gain   17.6  
Auction market     5.9 ______________________________ 
 Source: Compiled from data provided by participants surveyed. 
 
Table 2.7 indicates that over half of the 17 feedlots marketed fat cattle through 
rail bid. About 53 percent of the fat cattle were sold on the rail bid method, 30 percent 
sold on the live bid method, 24 percent sold either through contracts or by the feedlot 
listing the animals they had for sale and only about 12 percent were sold on the grid.  
Only about 1 percent of the animals sold went on the U.S. grid system. 
Table 2.7: Feedlot Preference in Marketing Fat Cattle: Saskatchewan  
Percentage of Feedlots 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Rail bid     52.9  
Live bid     29.4  
Contract     23.5  
List      23.5  
Grid      11.8 ________________________   
 Source: Compiled from data provided by participants surveyed. 
 
Table 2.8 outlines that nearly half the feedlots surveyed did not have a strategy 
to reduce price risk on their feed supplies this accounted for over 30 percent of the 
animals marketed.  Hedging barley was the preferred method of reducing price risk on 
feed supplies.  Feedlots hedged barley both to offset silage costs and grain costs.  
Generally, a ton of silage is priced at 10 to 12 time the price of a bushel of barley.   
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Table 2.8: Feedlot Risk Strategy for Feed Supply: Saskatchewan   
Percentage of Feedlots 
__________________________________________________________________ 
No strategy     47.1 
Hedge      29.4 
Forward contract    23.5 
Pre-buy       5.9__________________________ 
 Source: Compiled from data provided by participants surveyed. 
 
The feedlots that hedged barley accounted for more than half of the cattle 
marketed by the feedlots surveyed. Forward contracting was the second most popular 
method of reducing price risk on feed supplies.  Those feedlots that forward contracted 
accounted for about 15 percent of the cattle marketed by surveyed feedlots.  Only one 
feedlot bought barley in advance and this feedlot manager only did this when he felt 
barley prices were extremely low such that adding the cost of storage still made the 
barley low cost. 
Over 80 percent of the feedlots surveyed did not have a drought strategy in 
place.  One feedlots drought strategy was to keep sufficient silage to meet 9 months 
feeding requirements and hedged barley prices.  The feedlots that did not have a 
drought strategy accounted for nearly 70 percent of the cattle sold. 
Table 2.9: Feedlot Drought Strategy: Saskatchewan 
Percentage of Feedlots 
__________________________________________________________________ 
No strategy     82.4  
Some strategy     17.6 ________________________ 
 Source: Compiled from data provided by participants surveyed. 
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Only 17.6 percent of the feedlots surveyed had difficulty in obtaining 
employees5.  These feedlots were generally located a long distance from a major 
population centre. These feedlots accounted for over 10 percent of the animals 
marketed.  The feedlots that did not comment on availability of employees probably did 
not have difficulty in getting workers. 
Table 2.10: Availability of Feedlot Employees: Saskatchewan  
Percentage of Feedlots 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Did not say     47.1  
No problem      35.3  
Problem in getting employees  17.6___________________________ 
 Source: Compiled from data provided by participants surveyed. 
 
 
The majority of managers gained their feedlot management experience by 
starting their own feedlot and learned as they progressed in the business.  All these 
managers started small and gradually expanded.  The next most common experience 
was for the manager to grow up in the business.  In this case their father likely managed 
the feedlot prior to them.  These two methods of obtaining management experience each 
accounted for more than 40 percent of the cattle marketed. 
Table 2.11:  Obtaining Feedlot Management Skills: Saskatchewan 
Percentage of Feedlots 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Started the business and learned as the business grew  58.8  
Grew up in the business       23.5  
Worked on other feedlots      17.6 ______ 
 Source: Compiled from data provided by participants surveyed. 
 
 
Table 2.12 provides some of the feedlot managers reasons for lack of local 
investment in the cattle feeding business in Saskatchewan. Here local investment is 
                                                 
5 Industry sources indicate that feedlot labour requirements are about one person per thousand feeder 
cattle. 
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defined as investment from within the province and specifically within the local 
community.  All feedlot managers believed that there are hindrances to local investment 
but not necessarily for their feedlots situation.  The main hindrance provided was the 
provincial mentality6 towards grain production however about a quarter of the feedlots 
felt that they were getting sufficient local investment. About a quarter of the feedlot 
managers felt that poor relationships between grain farmers and feedlots7, lack of 
people in the province who are familiar with feeding cattle, lack of local money 
available for investment and the high risk nature of feeding cattle were also major 
hindrances to local investment.  Other reasons provided by only one or two feedlot 
managers for lack of local investment were: the loss of the Beef Stabilization program8, 
lack of experience by feedlot managers in accessing venture capital, local people are 
low risk takers, negative attitude towards intensive livestock operations, order buyers 
                                                 
6 This is often referred to as the grain mentality which means that land should be used for grain 
production rather than forage production for livestock.  One feedlot manager explained that he had a 
barley crop that had a yield potential of over 30 bushels per acre during a drought year.  This crops 
expected yield was about 50% greater that the district average.  When the feedlot manager cut the crop 
for silage his neighbours thought this was the wrong strategy because barley prices would be high.  They 
thought he would gross over $90 per acre if he had not cut the crop. The feedlot manager indicated that 
the silage yielded 5 tons per acre at a value of $30 per ton thus the crop grossed over $150 per acre with 
lower inputs because he did not have to use as many herbicides.  The feedlot manager reported that his 
grain neighbours could not believe him. 
7 Some feedlot managers complained that grain producers would rather sell their barley to an elevator 
than make a contract to supply barley to the feedlot.  So feedlot managers had to purchase barley through 
an elevator company rather than the local grain producer.  The feedlot manager said that he could have 
bought the grain at a lower price from the grain producer and the grain producer could have still received 
a higher price than at the elevator because of the transaction costs associated with selling the grain to the 
elevator company then buying it from the elevator.  Discussions with some grain producers suggest that 
trust is an issue.  They hear of situations where barley producers did not get paid for the barley they sold 
to the feedlot.  So to some barley producers the transaction costs are higher in their view with feedlots 
than with elevator companies.  Buyers at grain elevator companies are required to be bonded.  It should 
be noted however that there are reported cases of barley producers not getting paid from grain brokers 
who are also bonded and purchased grain on behalf of Alberta feedlots.  Yet this has not stopped barley 
producers from selling barley to grain brokers. 
8 The Beef Stabilization Program was a provincial program designed to encourage feedlot development in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s.  It tried to provide price stability to the feedlot sector.  It was a popular 
program among beef producers and feedlot managers. 
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dominated the business, Albertas industry is to strong too compete with, lack of 
provincial economic momentum and the beef industry is an old boys club. 
Table 2.12: Hindrances to Local Investment into Cattle Feeding: Saskatchewan 
 
Percentage of Feedlots          Percentage of Feedlots 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Grain mentality   41.2 Hard to Exit    17.6 
Not a problem for them  23.5 Hard to Start    17.6 
No money to invest   23.5 Lack of Gov. support   17.6 
High risk business   23.5 Bad feedlot investment experience 17.6 
Not familiar with feeding  23.5 Community ownership bad  17.6 
Feedlots vs. grain farmers  23.5 Lack of Management Resources 17.6_ 
 Source: Compiled from data provided by participants surveyed. 
 
Table 2.13 gives the opinions of 17 feedlot managers on hindrances to foreign 
investment. Here foreign investment refers to out of province investment. One feedlot 
manager felt he was not qualified to comment on foreign investment. Some managers 
felt it was a good thing not to have foreign investment.  These managers did not 
elaborate if competition or some other reasons they did not want foreign investment in  
Table 2.13: Hindrances to Foreign Investment into Cattle Feeding: Saskatchewan 
 
Percentage of Feedlots 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Yes  it is a problem    58.8 
Not a problem      35.3 
Land and labour laws    35.3  
No government support   17.6  
Lack of packing and processing  11.8 
Dont want foreign investment   11.8  
Exiting problem    11.8 
No comment         5.9   ________________________ 
 Source: Compiled from data provided by participants surveyed. 
 
the feedlot sector.  But most of the managers felt foreign investment was desirable 
because it would increase access to capital. However over half of the managers felt that 
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lack of foreign investment was a problem and that the provincial land9 and labour laws10 
were the major reason for this lack of investment.  Other reasons given by two or more 
feedlots included lack of government support for the cattle industry, lack of beef 
processing and packing facilities and difficulty in finding a buyer for their feedlot.  It 
was felt that the fact that feedlots were spread out and were expensive to buy made it 
difficult for feedlot owners to sell their feedlot.  Here it was thought that there was 
economic synergy developed around a cluster of feedlots. This was viewed as not a 
problem in Alberta where feedlots are concentrated so there is more competition to buy 
an existing feedlot.  The fact that it may be difficult to get environmental approval to 
build new feedlots further increases the value of existing feedlots in Alberta. Other 
opinions given for lack of foreign investment include: high property taxes, Outlook 
irrigation area does not want intensive livestock operations, there is already excess 
capacity in western Canada, feeding cattle is a risky business, old money likes to stay 
where it is and feedlot managers do not have experience in accessing equity capital. 
When prompted nearly fifty percent of the feedlot managers thought lack of 
entrepreneurial spirit in the province hindered feedlot development.  They felt that 
unwillingness to take risk, lack of entrepreneurial experience, that no entrepreneurs 
were around to mentor would-be entrepreneurs, and that a production mentality 
compared to a marketing mentality were the main reasons for not having an 
entrepreneurial spirit.  Other reasons given were: jealous of success, lack of capital, low 
                                                 
9 At the time the survey was done the provincial land ownership laws restricted the amount of land non- 
Saskatchewan residents could own.  Exemptions were provided where it was thought that the foreign 
investor required extra land for their enterprise.  This law has since been changed such that there no 
longer are any land ownership restrictions to Canadian residents.  
10 There are discussions at Sask. Labour to remove feedlots and hog barns as being exempt from the 
labour laws.  This means that holidays, minimum wages and other labour regulations would have to be 
adhered to by the feedlot which could increase their labour costs.  
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value put on irrigation land, reluctance to change, rural depopulation, livestock smell is 
no longer thought as part of rural life, and lack of feeding experience.  However, some 
feedlot managers felt that the next generation had potential for developing a stronger 
entrepreneurial spirit.  The education system was the reason given for the potential 
change in attitude of the next generation.  
Table 2.14: Entrepreneurial Spirit and Feedlot Development: Saskatchewan  
Percentage of Feedlots 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Yes, it is a problem    47.1   
Not a problem     35.3  
Low risk takers    35.3 
No comment     17.6  
Lack of expertise or confidence  17.6  
Production mentality     11.8___________________________ 
 Source: Compiled from data provided by participants surveyed. 
 
Over 80 percent of the feedlot managers interviewed felt that they had 
community support for their feedlots and did not think it a problem for future 
development.  Most of the feedlots near dense population centres did things to cultivate 
community support. This included planting trees around the feedlot to improve 
aesthetics and reduce smell, removing and spreading manure quickly to reduce the 
number of days with smell and grading and watering roads when the feedlot is heavily 
using them such as when they bring in silage or remove manure.  
Table 2.15: Community Attitude towards ILOs: Saskatchewan  
Percentage of Feedlots 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Not a problem      82.4 
Yes it is a problem       17.6 
Due to environmental concerns   17.6 
Feedlots need to cultivate local support    5.9____________________ 
 Source: Compiled from data provided by participants surveyed. 
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The issue of infrastructure was evenly split among feedlot managers.  Those 
who were located on good highways and had access to good schools, water and 
hospitals did not see it as an issue those who were not located as favourably saw it as a 
major hindrance to feedlot development.  For example it was calculated that a 10,000  
Table 2.16: Infrastructure and Feedlot Development: Saskatchewan  
Percentage of Feedlots 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Not a problem    47.1 
Yes, it is a problem   47.1 
Lack of primary highways  35.3  
Lack of water    17.6 
Yes, but not for us   11.8 
No comment      5.9   
Lack of schools and hospitals    5.9________________________________ 
 Source: Compiled from data provided by participants surveyed. 
 
head feedlot located on a secondary highway would cost between $140,000 and 
$180,000 annually due to extra transportation costs in accessing barley. This calculation 
did not include the cost of shipping cattle into and out of the feedlot. Some commented 
that the lack of infrastructure is limiting economic growth in the province which in turn 
impacts the level of investment in feedlot development. 
Table 2.17 shows that nearly 90 percent of the feedlot managers felt that the 
provincial government was not interested in developing the beef industry when 
prompted about the provincial governments promotion of the beef industry.  They felt 
that provincial officials only give lip service towards the industry.  They support their 
conclusion based on the lack of financial and other resources dedicated to the industry11. 
                                                 
11 This lack of confidence in the provincial governments desire to support the development of the beef 
industry could go back to the mid 1980s when some provincial upper management civil servants 
indicated that they thought that the feedlot sector was lost to Alberta and shifted staff resources away 
from beef production and towards hog production and specialized livestock production.  This decision 
followed an attempt to promote the feedlot sector in the late 1970s and early 1980s through the Beef 
Stabilization Program which was phased out and replaced by a less lucrative federal stabilization 
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They indicated that the Alberta government viewed supporting the livestock industry as 
a high priority12 during the drought while in Saskatchewan the discussion was around 
maintaining grain farmers.  Other examples for lack of government support were the 
lack of significant expansion in the Livestock Loan Guarantee Program13, Farm Land 
Security Act14, the new labour laws, lack of drought support such as Crop Insurance15 
rules hindering cutting grain crops for green feed and no support for pasture and water 
development, as well as putting resources towards special livestock and herbs and 
spices rather than towards established agricultural industries such as beef. 
Table 2.17: Saskatchewan Government’s Promotion of the Feedlot Sector 
Percentage of Feedlots 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Only lip service towards the beef industry   88.2 
Does not support the industry      23.5 
Does not support the industry like Alberta    17.6 
Did not expand the Livestock Loan Guarantee Program 17.6 
No comment         11.8   
No Leadership       11.8______________ 
 Source: Compiled from data provided by participants surveyed. 
 
Most of the feedlot managers saw a role for government in supporting the 
feedlot sector.  They mainly wanted government to aid them in obtaining financing.  
The fact that Saskatchewan does not have a strong cattle feeding sector makes it 
                                                                                                                                               
program.  This federal program was referred to as The Tri-Partite Beef Stabilization Program which is 
now discontinued. 
12 Alberta instituted a number of programs to keep their beef industry such as feed freight assistance and 
improved crop insurance for pastures and forage production.  While Saskatchewan did not provide any 
drought programs to aid beef producers.  
13 In this program the Saskatchewan government guarantees a certain portion of bank loans that groups of 
cow-calf producers (called Feeder Associations or Breeder Associations) borrow to acquire feeder cattle 
or to retain ownership of their own calves to be custom fed in feedlots.  Feedlot managers want this 
program expanded in two ways:  to expand the money available to feeder associations and to expand the 
program so that feedlots can access loan guarantees.  Most banks and credit unions participate in this 
program. 
14 This is the act that restricts non-Saskatchewan residents ownership of land.  This act has now been 
changed to only restrict land ownership of non-Canadian residents. 
15 A discussion with the Deputy Minister of Agriculture regarding this research has resulted in him 
promising to investigate ways that Saskatchewan Crop Insurance can address this issue. 
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difficult to get operating capital to purchase and feed cattle from financial institutions.  
They felt that many bank managers did not understand the feeding sector.  Financial 
institutions prefer land for security rather than livestock, whereas in Alberta financial 
institutions are more willing to take livestock to secure loans. Feedlot managers also 
saw the governments role in increasing services such as extension either to themselves 
or cow-calf producers, financial assistance for water development and increasing 
livestock inspectors as activities the government should follow. Many felt strengthening 
the cow-calf sector would indirectly help feedlot development.  Some feedlot managers 
expressed concern over the province promoting the development of the feedlot sector 
especially community owned feedlots.  They felt there is not enough planning put into 
these developments which will increase their chance of failure.  Feedlot failures reduce 
investment for future feedlots and existing feedlots because potential investors view 
failures as increasing investment risk. Improving infrastructure and streamlining 
regulations16 were other areas they saw government should be involved. Feedlot 
managers indicated frustration with the numerous different departments they have to go 
through to get approval for expansion. They also felt that government policy is 
compartmentalized in that they have different objectives and create policies that meet 
department objective but are not friendly toward industry development. Other opinions 
                                                 
16 Feedlot managers complained that they would have to speak to several government departments in 
order to expand their feedlot.  For example Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization 
provides permits to expand the capacity of the feedlot, SaskWater provides permits to expand water use 
for the feedlot, Saskatchewan Environment and Resource Management (SERM) for environmental 
permits and Saskatchewan Highways for transportation permits.  Feedlot Mangers further express 
concern about the government being so compartmentalized that departments appear to be at cross 
purposes.  For example one department may be charged with the responsibility of economic development 
while another is concerned with resource protection.  These different objectives result in policies that do 
not necessarily mesh together. For example SaskWater may require a feedlot to obtain its water from a 
certain water source while SERM may require the feedlot to be located away from that water course 
because of soil constraints and Saskatchewan Highways might require secondary loads to be hauled 
because the site is not on a primary highway.  The lack of streamlining combined with economic 
constraints reduces the number or sites available for development and increases site search costs. 
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were that the government should not take any equity positions in feedlots, help 
strengthen relationships between grain producers and feedlots and reduce taxes. 
Table 2.18: Saskatchewan Government’s Role in the Feedlot Sector  
Percentage of Feedlots 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Help with financing      64.7 
Increase services        29.4 
Improve infrastructure      17.6 
Help existing feedlots before encouraging new ones  17.6 
Policy development is too compartmentalized  17.6 
Streamline regulations     17.6 
No comment           5.9 ______________ 
 Source: Compiled from data provided by participants surveyed. 
 
In summary the Saskatchewan beef cow herd has remained relatively stable 
while fed cattle production has continued to decline in the province.  In order to turn 
this trend in fed cattle production Saskatchewan faces a number of challenges which 
include shifting from a predominately grain towards livestock production  This shift 
requires developing the economic infrastructure for feeding cattle as well as developing 
the human skills throughout the beef cattle marketing chain. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
 
This chapter outlines economic research into the western Canadian beef industry 
and the potential for its expansion in Saskatchewan.  This chapter also introduces the 
economic theory regarding transaction costs and lays the foundation for determining 
their impact on the feedlot sector. The literature review is in two parts.  The first part 
will review some of the literature that describes the western Canadian feedlot sector.  
The second part will have two sections on transaction costs. The first section develops 
transaction cost economic (TCE) theory that is applicable to the theoretical model 
developed in chapter 4.  The final section reviews some of the literature that measures 
transaction costs. 
 
3.1 The Western Canadian Beef Industry 
 
This section will examine research in the structure and potential expansion of 
the feedlot industry in Alberta and Saskatchewan. 
Carter and Schmitz (1986) looked at the economics and location of cattle 
feeding in western Canada during the early 1980s.  They theorized that the location of 
cattle feeding would be where there was a source of feed supplies in order to reduce the 
transformation costs from feeder animals to finished cattle.  They observed that during 
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the decade prior to the 1980s the feedlot industry had shifted from throughout the 
prairies to southern Alberta.  They noted that the shift not only was westerly across the 
prairies but from northern Alberta to southern Alberta as well.  
In comparing Alberta to Saskatchewan they observed that during the period 
1971-1982 Albertas cash receipts from the sale of cattle averaged 36 percent of total 
farm cash receipts with a range from 30 percent to 42 percent. Conversely 
Saskatchewans cash receipts from the sale of cattle dropped from 19.9 percent to 12.6 
percent during the same period.  They noted that the Alberta beef sector was strong and 
growing while Saskatchewans was weak and declining.  
Carter and Schmitz (1986) tried to determine the factors that led to the shift in 
the cattle-feeding (feedlot) sector to southern Alberta.  They used personal interviews 
with feedlot operators in Saskatchewan and Alberta as their primary source of analysis. 
They determined that the key economic factors affecting the feedlot sector were feed 
supply and cost, marketing infrastructure, scale of operation, feedlot management, 
ownership of cattle and government support. 
Roughage was the most restrictive feed because of the cost of transporting this 
bulky feed a long distance.  Barley was relatively easy to obtain because at that time 
Alberta and Saskatchewan were both surplus producers.  Carter and Schmitz (1986) did 
not find Alberta had an economic advantage in feeding over Saskatchewan in terms of 
feeding barley.  However, they found a different situation when it came to the 
availability of roughage.  Irrigation in southern Alberta was a major contributing factor 
to the supply of roughage in the form of cereal and corn silage.  Silage production fitted 
well into the crop rotation of irrigated land.  Alberta had 850,000 acres of irrigated land 
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while Saskatchewan had only 170,000 acres in 1981.  They noted that the irrigated land 
in Alberta was concentrated in southern Alberta while Saskatchewans was more spread 
out.  They found that irrigation allowed Alberta feedlots to obtain their silage within a 
10-mile radius of their feedlot thereby reducing transportation costs. 
In terms of marketing structure Carter and Schmitz (1986) found that Alberta 
feedlots had an advantage over Saskatchewan feedlots.  This advantage was due to 
Alberta feedlots having more packing plants bidding for their slaughter cattle thus a 
more competitive market. Another marketing advantage was Alberta had developed a 
weekly reserve bid system.  This bid system essentially resulted in packing plants 
providing sealed bids independent of each other. Thus it was possible for five packers to 
bid against each other for one feedlots slaughter cattle. 
Carter and Schmitz (1986) found that the existence of feeder associations in 
Alberta aided in the ownership of cattle.  They also observed that Alberta feedlots were 
much larger than those in Saskatchewan.  This combined with significant economies of 
scale in the feedlot operations gave Alberta feedlots an advantage over Saskatchewan 
feedlots.  They felt that the number of feedlots in Alberta created a stronger feeding 
infrastructure including development of feedlot managers.  They did not observe 
managers moving into Saskatchewan although management skill should be easily 
transferable between provinces. One reason they speculated was that the stronger 
infrastructure in Alberta made managing a feedlot easier than it would be in 
Saskatchewan.  Carter and Schmitz (1986) further found that the Alberta government17 
                                                 
17 Some argue that the Alberta government enabled the development of its feedlot sector through its 
program on feed freight assistance.  This program was designed to offset the impact of the federal 
transportation subsidy on feed grain.  The Alberta government argued that the transportation subsidy 
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was more supportive of the beef industry compared to Saskatchewans government, 
which was more crops oriented and in particular the production of wheat. They 
observed that Alberta had a strong history in feeding cattle compared to Saskatchewan. 
Carter and Schmitz (1986) examined the availability of feeder cattle and could not show 
Alberta having an advantage over Saskatchewan in this regard.   
Ramsay (2002) investigated the potential for future feedlot expansion in Alberta. 
She found that the trends of increased beef production in Alberta and decreased beef 
production in Saskatchewan reported by Carter and Schmitz continued through to 2002.  
She reports that in 2002, about 60 percent of Albertas farm cash receipts came from 
livestock and livestock products and 31 percent from crop sales.  In contrast, she reports 
62 percent of Saskatchewans farm cash receipts came from crops sales and 25 percent 
came from livestock sales, of which 70 percent came from the sale of cattle and calves.  
She indicates that by 1999 Albertas fed-cattle production increased to 2.4 million head 
while Saskatchewans decreased to less than 200,000 head. 
Ramsay (2002) could not find any evidence that lack of feed supplies would 
restrict the growth of Albertas feedlot sector.  However, she did find that water, 
manure disposal, and public resistance could act as restraints.  She reports that Alberta 
consumes water at a higher rate than the natural recharge.  Water quality and competing 
interests for water use were also issues.  She found that Albertas irrigation acreage 
increased to 1.2 million acres by 2000.  Thus irrigation demand for water has increased 
along with residential and non-agricultural industries demand. 
                                                                                                                                               
made feed grains too expensive for feedlots.  Another program that helped feedlot development in 
southern Alberta was the Alberta governments investment in irrigation development. 
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Ramsay (2002) indicated that Albertans had growing environmental concerns 
with intensive livestock operations (ILOs) such as feedlots.  Their concerns centre on 
smell and manure disposal.  Improper spreading of manure can lead to poor water 
quality. The concentration of feedlots in southern Alberta intensifies these 
environmental issues. She found that social tension around ILOs stopped feedlot 
development even when the proponents met all the Alberta governments environmental 
regulations. 
Perillat et al. (2002) investigated the potential of feedlot development in the 
irrigation areas around Outlook and Riverhurst, Saskatchewan.  They conducted 
interviews with local residents.  They found that the feedlot development in these 
irrigation areas was problematic.  The irrigation area surrounding Riverhurst was too 
small to support a large feedlot.  A large feedlot was defined as one that had 20,000 
head capacity or larger.  In addition the Riverhurst irrigation area was in a horseshoe 
shape making transportation of silage to a central location difficult.  The Luck Lake 
irrigation development was also thought to be too small.  Poor infrastructure in terms of 
highways, schools and hospitals were also thought to be restrictions to feedlot 
development in the Riverhurst and Luck Lake irrigation districts. 
Perillat et al. (2002) found that the Outlook irrigation district was thought to be 
large enough to support a large feedlot.  However, feedlot development here was also 
problematic. The Outlook area has many small acreage owners who are not farmers.  
These people are not interested in any smells that will negatively impact their rural 
lifestyle. Thus Outlook has social issues with ILO development.  Many residents are 
unhappy with existing ILOs in the area and do not wish to see any more.  Outlook 
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residents stated that lack of infrastructure in terms of primary haul highways and 
irrigation land are also restrictions. Residents felt that the competition for irrigation land 
made it difficult to produce silage for potential feedlots.  Lack of capital and a non-
livestock mentality18 were also thought to be restrictions to feedlot development. 
Infrastructure in terms of primary highway access was a concern expressed by 
both residents of Outlook and Riverhurst irrigation districts and potential feedlot 
developers. Transportation costs were thought to increase significantly where there are 
no primary haul highways. Extra transportation costs due to lack of a primary highway 
was reported as one reason that an out-of-province feedlot operator did not relocate his 
feedlot operation to the Riverhurst irrigation district.  This was the only feedlot operator 
that had expressed interest recently in relocating his operation.  
In summary, this research found that environmental concerns could be a limiting 
factor for feedlot development in southern Alberta.  Feedlot development in 
Saskatchewans irrigation districts is also unlikely.  Lack of highway infrastructure was 
a concern in both irrigation districts studied.  Growing public resistance to intensive 
livestock operations is another hindrance to feedlot development in the Outlook 
irrigation district.  Thus any feedlot development in Saskatchewan will likely occur near 
primary highways, away from large population centres and on dry land that can produce 
silage yields comparable to irrigated land. 
 
                                                 
18 This is compared to a grain mentality.  For example some barley producers do not think of selling their 
barley to a feedlot as first choice.  Rather they prefer to deliver to the elevator and sell it as malt.  The 
probability of receiving malt is relatively low.  Yet barley producers seed malt varieties rather than feed 
varieties.  Feed varieties are usually better yielding and are better suited for feeding. 
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3.2 Theoretical Framework 
 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the development of TCE theory.  The 
discussion will begin with the standard neoclassical assumptions and develop the TCE 
theory pertinent for this thesis. 
Neoclassical economic theory is the foundation of most of todays economists 
tool kit. The perfectly competitive market is the starting point of most current economic 
theory because it provides a benchmark for assessing economic efficiency.  The 
literature indicates six key assumptions for a perfectly competitive market.  These 
assumptions are outlined as follows: 
a. Large number of buyers and sellers such that neither is able to impact 
price which means both buyers and sellers are price takers. 
b. The goods and services that are bought and sold within that market are 
homogeneous which means each suppliers product is identical. 
c. Buyers and sellers have perfect information about the market price and 
attributes of goods and services as well as being able to use and process 
this information in order to always make fully rational decisions. 
d. Free mobility of resources that implies free entry and exit within a 
market. 
e. Individual persons and firms make rational decisions based on self-
interest. Therefore the purpose of the firm is to maximize profit. 
f. All firms producing a product face identical cost constraints.  This 
implies that these firms are identical. 
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Many economists indicate that implicit within the perfectly competitive market 
is zero transaction costs.  This frictionless market implies no externalities such that the 
actions of one will not hurt anyone else. 
R.H. Coase indicated that in neoclassical theory the price mechanism or the 
market determines the allocation of resources in the production process. He argued in 
his famous essay, The Nature of the Firm (1937), that in the real world this is not 
necessarily true. In this paper Coase provides the reason for the existence of firms. He 
indicates there is a cost to doing business in the marketplace as well as a cost in 
transacting business within the firm and that the optimum sized firm would be where 
the marginal cost of transacting business within the firm equals the marginal cost of 
doing business in the marketplace. He gave an example of a workman changing jobs 
from one department to another within a firm not because of an increase in wage but 
because he is ordered to do so by managerial direction.  He indicated that this was done 
because it was less costly to organize the labour resources within the firm than to have 
separate transactions in the market to obtain different workers for different tasks.  Thus, 
the allocation of resources is either done in the marketplace by a series of transactions 
or coordinated within the firm.  He argued that there would be no need for firms if the 
marketplace were solely able to regulate production. 
In his 1937 paper Coase implies the existence of transaction costs. He argued 
that in the marketplace there is a cost to exchange because there is a cost in obtaining 
price information and negotiating contracts. He further argued that firms are limited in 
what they can organize efficiently.  That is he theorized there are diminishing returns 
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to management19.   Thus the size of a firm would depend on its organizing costs and 
the cost of transacting business in the market place.  He stated: 
Inventions which tend to bring factors of production nearer together, by lessening 
spatial distribution tend to increase the size of the firm.  Changes like the telephone 
and the telegraph, which tend to reduce the cost of organizing spatially, will tend to 
increase the size of the firm.  All changes which improve managerial technique will 
tend to increase the size of the firm. 20 
 
 
Thus, the size of the firm is limited by its cost of organizing compared to another firms 
cost of organizing, and that of the market place.   
Ultimately Coases paper on the theory of the firm outlined the importance of 
transaction costs and implied that by ignoring these costs economists are designing 
decision tools that are not relevant to the real economic world.  Without the existence of 
transaction costs the production and exchange activities in the production and marketing 
of a product would be carried out through the guiding invisible hand of the market.  
The second major outcome of this paper is that Coase provides a theoretical framework 
to determine the size of the firm. 
Economists did not immediately respond to Coases observations until Coase 
wrote another famous paper in 1960 called The Problem of Social Cost.  Out of this 
paper came the Coase Theorem. The theorem states that in the absence of transaction 
costs the social cost is equal to the private cost. Another important element of this paper 
is that Coase outlines three groups of transaction costs that can be measured.  He states: 
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that 
one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, 
to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up a contract, to undertake 
                                                 
19 Coase (1937), page 395. 
20 Coase (1937), page 397. 
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the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, 
and so on.21 
 
Dahlman (1979) later states these costs more succinctly as search and 
information costs, bargaining (negotiating) and decision costs, policing (monitoring) 
and enforcement costs.22  He then indicates that all these costs arise out of a single cost 
 resource losses due to lack of information.  That is imperfect information results in the 
existence of transaction costs. 
The following example helps illustrate Coases contribution to TCE.  A feedlot 
or packing plant can either contract their purchase of cattle through order buyers, hire 
their own people to inspect and purchase cattle or develop an arrangement between 
themselves and the supplier such that they receive the type of cattle they need (direct 
purchases compared to purchasing through the auction market).  In the absence of 
transaction costs it would not make any difference which method the feedlot or packing 
plant chose.  However, most feedlots use order buyers or buy directly from cow-calf 
producers because they are less costly than hiring an employee to scour the country side 
for cattle.  Yet packing plants tend to use all three methods to source cattle depending 
on which one is of lowest cost.  Thus transaction costs are important in determining the 
method of purchasing cattle. 
Economists began to look at TCE after these two essays by Coase.  Three 
streams of economic theory are discussed in this thesis, which are the development of 
the assumptions surrounding transaction cost theory; the development of organizational 
structure as explained by TCE and the impact of product attributes on transaction costs. 
                                                 
21 Coase (1960) page 15. 
22 Dahlman (1979) page 148. 
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Oliver E. Williamson began writing about organizational structure and TCE in 
the 1970s and 1980s.  He compiled much of his work in his book Economic 
Organization: Firms, Markets and Policy Control in 1986.  All references to 
Williamson within this section will be from his 1986 book, beginning with his 
development of transaction cost assumptions and followed by his discussion of 
organizational structure. 
Williamson defined a transaction as occurring when a good or service is 
transferred across a technologically-separable interface.  One stage of processing or 
assembly activity terminates and another begins.23 The relative ease or complexity of 
this transfer is reflected in the cost. Thus, Williamsons definition of transaction costs 
includes costs incurred within the firm as well as inter-firm costs. Coase implied the 
same definition but did not formally define transaction costs. 
Williamson further indicated three important elements of transaction cost 
economics. These are asset specificity, bounded rationality and opportunism. The latter 
two are referred to as behavioural assumptions underpinning transaction cost analysis. 
He argued that economic contracting problems would be trivial if there were no 
bounded rationality and opportunism. 
Williamson describes bounded rationality as the situation in which human 
beings are unable to make rational decisions because of their finite capacity to absorb, 
process and obtain information (Simon [1961] was the first to use the term bounded 
rationality). That is, people may not make a rational decision based on the information 
that is available to them because the information is too complex for them. In addition in 
                                                 
23 Williamson, 1986: page 139. 
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some cases it will be virtually impossible for the human mind to determine and analyze 
all the possible ramifications of a series of decisions. This implies any agreement 
between individuals will be incomplete because the parties involved cannot foresee all 
the economic factors that will impact that arrangement.  Bounded rationality further 
implies that people could interpret the same information differently. 
Opportunism is similar to the self-interest assumption in neoclassical economic 
theory, only with guile.  That is individuals could use any means available to them to 
improve their position through misrepresentation of product attributes, behaviour, data 
and any other representation of facts.  Opportunism with information asymmetry leads 
to moral hazard and adverse selection because it is not possible to determine which 
parties, if any, will act opportunistically. 
Adverse selection and moral hazard occurs where buyers cannot distinguish 
between good or bad quality products.  Adverse selection occurs because consumers 
know they cannot distinguish between products and choose not to buy for fear of buying 
a poor product or will only buy at a lower price that reflects their uncertainty over 
quality. This is Akerlofs  (1970) argument in his famous paper Market for  Lemons.  
Moral hazard arises because the sellers could produce poorer quality products than they 
are capable of producing.  Sellers know that buyers are unable to make the distinction 
between products and some sellers chose to produce a poor quality product. In the case 
of contracts, parties cannot fully discern the actions of another. Adverse selection 
occurs prior to contractual arrangement (ex ante) because parties may not choose to get 
into a good contract for fear of being taken advantage of by the other parties. Moral 
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hazard happens after a contractual arrangement has been made (ex post) because one or 
more of the parties may try not to meet their full contractual commitments.  
The third element for transaction cost economics as defined by Williamson is 
asset specificity.   Asset specificity refers to the degree of transaction specific 
investments and will be defined in greater detail later in this section. 
Williamson indicated that asset specificity, bounded rationality and opportunism 
need to be present for transactions to be costly.  Contracting becomes simple and less 
costly if any of these three conditions are absent.  Without bounded rationality any 
contract can be written to deal with any situation.  Without opportunism the agents 
word would be sufficient and the spirit of the contract would overcome any missing 
elements in the contract.  Without asset specificity the market would determine the 
outcome such that competition would overcome bounded rationality and opportunism. 
According to Williamson firms will organize in a manner that will minimize 
both their production and transaction costs. He indicates there are three critical 
dimensions that determine organizational structure, thus minimizing their transaction 
costs.  The degree of asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency of transactions all 
contribute to how a firm conducts its transactions either through a vertically integrated 
structure, contractual relationships or through spot markets. 
Williamson describes asset specificity in terms of alternate uses for a particular 
investment.  He indicates that asset specificity can arise in three forms, physical asset 
specificity, site specificity and human asset specificity.  An example of physical asset 
specificity would be a company that makes auto bodies for an automobile 
manufacturing company. This company has to invest in building body molds in order to 
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build the auto bodies. These molds can not be used on any other vehicle so they are 
specific to that automobile company and type of automobile.  Thus both the buyer and 
the seller of auto bodies in this example could be subject to opportunistic behaviour. 
Site specificity refers to the location of the facility which limits the companys 
access to major buyers or sellers.  For example a grain elevator built on a particular rail 
siding makes it a highly specific investment. The railroad company could act 
opportunistically in the freight rates it charges the elevator because the elevator does not 
have any alternative low cost carriers.  
Human asset specificity refers to a persons skills and knowledge that are gained 
doing a particular job (Williamson 1986).  If these skills and knowledge are not easily 
transferable or easily acquired then there is an opportunity for the employer or 
employee to act opportunistically towards the other. For example train engineers are 
highly skilled in how to drive and operate trains.  This skill is not easily transferable to 
any other job. Thus train engineers and railroad companies can act opportunistically 
towards each other particularly if there is only one railroad company or only one 
supplier of train engineers.  
Hobbs and Young (2000) discuss perishability of food and its impact on 
transaction costs. Perishability could be thought of as another form of asset specificity. 
For example finished cattle have a relatively small window in which they can be sold 
otherwise they begin to lose finish.  That is the animal gets overweight and begins to 
lose quality.  The finishing feedlot also incurs additional feeding costs thus the feedlot 
wants to sell the animal as soon as it reaches finish.  Perishability could allow for 
opportunistic behaviour by food processors. 
59 
Williamson defined the degree of asset specificity as being non-specific, mixed 
and idiosyncratic. An idiosyncratic asset would be highly specific such as the 
automobile body building company described earlier in this section where the output is 
specialized to the needs of only one buyer. He further defined the frequency of 
transactions in three broad categories. The categories are one-time, occasional and 
recurrent. Williamson then dropped the one-time category because it rarely happens.  
Further more the one-time category does not have any interesting implications in terms 
of effect on supply chain relationships.   
Williamson further indicated that non-specific asset specificity refers to the 
absence of asset specificity and results in the market place working normally regardless 
of the level of uncertainty or frequency of transactions.  He referred to this as market 
governance or classical contracting.   In this case market alternatives protect entities 
from opportunism. Mixed and highly idiosyncratic asset specificity with occasional 
frequency results in a governance structure that allows for third party assistance or 
arbitration.  He referred to this type as trilateral governance or neoclassical 
contracting.    In this situation the transacting entities rely on a third party to resolve 
disputes before going to litigation. Often government agencies act as the third party. 
Williamson indicated that recurring transactions with mixed asset specificity results in 
bilateral governance.  Here parties recognize they need each other and rely on this need 
to maintain the relationship to guide the contract.  They want flexible contracts that 
allow for adjustment as situations change and rely on trust and mutual need to overcome 
the hazard of opportunism.  In this case the two parties negotiate a suitable agreement. 
Recurrent transactions with highly idiosyncratic assets lead to unified governance or 
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vertical integration.  Here the transactions are internalized into the firm or in other 
words they become vertically integrated. 
Williamson further stated that uncertainty moves the above governance 
structures further towards vertical integration.  For example an occasional transaction 
with mixed asset specificity combined with a high degree of risk such as quality risk 
can lead to bilateral governance or unified governance.  As explained earlier, quality 
risk leads to opportunistic behaviour in the form of adverse selection or moral hazard.  
This increases search and information costs as well as monitoring and enforcement 
costs. In order to reduce these costs a firm would move towards higher levels of vertical 
co-ordination. 
Hobbs and Young (2000) break down uncertainty into four components. Both 
buyers and sellers may face price uncertainty.  Buyers also face product quality 
uncertainty and uncertainty in terms of reliability of supply. And finally, sellers face 
uncertainty in terms of reliability of demand.  They point out that each type of 
uncertainty raises transaction costs.  Price uncertainty increases negotiating and 
decision making costs, demand and supply uncertainty raises search and information 
costs and quality uncertainty increases monitoring and enforcement costs. 
Hobbs and Young (2000) discuss a fourth dimension to asset specificity, 
frequency of transactions and uncertainty  that is transaction complexity. Transaction 
complexity refers to the variety of outcomes a transaction may have.  Thus as 
transaction complexity increases so does the number of possible outcomes. For example 
if a commodity is highly perishable then the transactions pertaining to that commodity 
become more complex.  Transaction complexity increases because of the potential 
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deterioration of the commodity.  Increased monitoring costs are incurred because the 
commoditys quality must continue to be monitored as time progresses.  Negotiation 
costs increase as buyers and sellers try to determine who is responsible for loss in value 
of the commodity as it deteriorates or to what degree they share this loss.  Transaction 
complexity moves Williamsons governance structures further towards vertical 
integration. Thus bilateral governance or unified governance between firms would be 
expected if there is a high degree of transaction complexity, combined with an 
occasional transaction, mixed asset specificity and a low degree of risk. 
Hobbs and Young (2000) further argued that regulatory conditions, social-
economic factors and technology impact both the commodity characteristics and 
transactions cost. For example technology can impact transactions cost directly by 
reducing the cost and increasing the accuracy of product quality measurements.  
Technology could impact the commodity directly, which in turn impacts transaction 
costs. For example a new technology could reduce commodity perishability by 
changing the product itself or by changing how the product is preserved.  It may be 
possible to increase the shelf life of tomatoes by changing their genetic composition. Or 
it may be possible to improve the shelf life and safety of poultry by reducing the risk of 
salmonella. Socio-economic factors can also impact transactions cost directly or 
indirectly through commodity characteristics.  For example a negative consumer 
reaction against a technology such as irradiation of poultry products results in 
increasing product perishability, which in turn increases monitoring costs.  Finally 
regulation can impact transactions cost directly or indirectly through the characteristics 
of the commodity.  For example regulation could require tracing an animal for disease 
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control and identification.  This increases transactions cost directly in terms of 
recording each stage in the production process where the animal changes hands as well 
as increasing uncertainty in determining who is responsible for the cost of the sick 
animal (e.g. Chronic wasting decease in elk and deer) and demand uncertainty due to 
consumer reaction.  
Trust reduces transactions cost because it acts as a counterbalance to opportunistic 
behaviour. For example if there is trust developed between contracting entities then any 
unforeseen circumstance will be resolved within the spirit of the arrangement. 
Williamson indicated that as frequency of transactions increase so does the trust 
between the buyers and sellers. He states: 
 
Additional transaction-specific savings can accrue at the interface between supplier 
and buyer as contracts are successively adapted to unfolding events, and as periodic 
contract renewal agreements are reached.  Familiarity here permits communication 
economics to be realized: specialized language develops as experience accumulates 
and nuances are signalled and received in a sensitive way.  Both institutional and 
personal trust relations evolve.  Thus the individuals who are responsible for 
adapting the interfaces have a personal as well as an organizational stake in what 
transpires.  Where personal integrity is believed to be operative, individuals located 
at the interfaces may refuse to be a part of opportunistic effects to take advantage of 
(rely on) the letter of the contract when the spirit of the exchange is emasculated.  
Such refusals can serve as a check upon organizational proclivities to behave 
opportunistically.  Other things being equal, idiosyncratic exchange relations which 
feature personal trust will survive greater stress and display greater adaptability.24  
 
Daniel Klein in his article Trust for Hire: Voluntary Remedies for Quality and 
Safety which he reprinted in his 1997 book Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary 
Elicitation of Good conduct expanded on the idea of trust.  He indicated that trust is 
the combination of honesty and competence.  He argues that acting opportunistically 
                                                 
24 Williamson (1986), Page 106. 
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can be bad for business because it hurts ones reputation.  Therefore being trustworthy 
is good for business. He states in his article that a 
 
habit of deceit is a mark of a bad character, and bad character has a way of 
revealing itself no matter how cunning the individual.  Deceit is both bad karma and 
bad business.25   
 
So in Kleins view building trust is an important part of business relationships.  
Similar to Barzel (1989), Klein argues that the characteristics of a product are not fully 
known by consumers. For example how do consumers know if there are residual 
antibiotics in the meat they purchase.  As discussed earlier, opportunistic behaviour can 
arise if one cannot easily determine if a product is good or bad. Once consumers are 
aware that they can not distinguish between a good of bad product they may be 
reluctant to buy.  Therefore Klein (1997) argues suppliers will try to build trust in their 
products quality in order to encourage its consumption. 
Suppliers may build trust by self-disclosing information about their product 
either from their own research or from an independent source. They can gain trust, 
respect or reputation by offering guarantees, warranties, advertising, brand names, 
providing samples and having extended dealings with customers. Klein (1997) views 
guarantees, warranties and brand names as methods of purchasing trust when it does not 
exist. 
  For example order buyers need strong reputations in order to stay in the 
business of buying and selling cattle.  They need a reputation of fair dealing and ability 
in acquiring cattle within the requested quality and price guidelines. They gain this 
                                                 
25 Klein (1997), Page. 105. 
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reputation by extended dealings with a feedlot.  Once they have gained a reputation 
with one feedlot they can use this feedlot as a reference to begin dealings with other 
feedlots. Thus their good reputation grows within the industry.  So a good reputation 
can be hard to get but relatively easily lost.  Feedlots may tolerate some mistakes 
depending on the length of dealings with the order buyer but continued poor service 
would result in a loss of trust and severing of the relationship.  Klein (1997) points out 
consumers will inform other consumers about their experiences.  Just as a feedlot can 
act as a good reference they can also act as negative publicity to the order buyer once 
trust is lost. 
The example of an order buyer would be viewed as a good or service that has 
experience characteristics.  Klein (1997) argues that this type of product and those that 
have search characteristics are less vexing than products that have credence 
characteristics.  Quality of products that have experience characteristics can be 
determined by experience.  The quality of the product can be determined either by 
experiencing by oneself or by asking someone who has experienced the product.  
Products that have search characteristics can be determined prior to purchase such as 
the style of a house.  Products that exhibit credence characteristics cannot be determined 
even after using the product.  For example did the doctor give the correct diagnoses for 
an ailment or did he/she give a convenient answer in order to make room for the next 
patient.   
Klein (1997) indicates that suppliers or sellers will encourage extended dealings 
because they know satisfied customers or buyers will spread a positive report of their 
product. The fact that a seller has been around for an extended period of time provides a 
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level of trust to buyers.  He argues that buyers know that a business will not survive if it 
provides a poor quality product. A growing business or a franchise also signals 
trustworthiness to buyers.  Here they know that a business can only grow if it has 
satisfied customers. Thus size and length of time a seller has been in business translates 
into a level of trust to buyers that have not dealt with that seller before. Therefore it 
would be expected that a new small feedlot would need to expend more resources to 
gain trust with a packing plant than a larger established feedlot. 
To summarize this section, transaction costs are important in determining the 
organizational structure of a supply chain.  Firms will choose organizational structures 
that minimize both production and transaction costs.  Transaction costs are impacted by 
uncertainty, asset specificity and frequency of transactions as well as human 
behavioural characteristics such as opportunism and bounded rationality.  Transaction 
costs take on the form of search and information costs, negotiating and decision making 
costs, as well as monitoring and enforcement costs.  Building trust within a business 
relationship reduces transaction costs. Methods of measuring transactions costs will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
 
3.3 Measuring Transaction Costs 
 
Hobbs (1996c) points out that TCE theory has developed faster than methods of 
measuring transaction costs.  She suggests that the inherent difficulty in separating 
transaction costs from other costs and lack of data are two reasons economists are 
reluctance to attempt to measure transaction costs.   Transaction costs are not normally 
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recorded as part of a firms standard accounting practices neither are they tracked by 
government agencies. She argues that an accounting approach to empiricizing the 
transaction cost approach is impractical.26    
Hobbs (1996c) summarizes the literature in measuring transaction costs in three 
broad categories; evaluating the impact of transaction costs on vertical co-ordination 
across industries using secondary data, investigating industry specific impacts of 
transaction costs on vertical co-ordination using secondary data, and investigating 
industry specific impacts of transaction costs on vertical co-ordination using primary 
data.   She points out the use of primary data is preferred but is costly since it often 
requires the researcher to survey participants within the industry being studied. A 
review of the following studies is intended to provide some of the approaches to 
transaction cost analysis within the food industry and specifically within the beef 
industry. 
Frank and Henderson (1992) use secondary data in their examination of the 
effect of transaction costs on determining vertical co-ordination in the United States 
food industry.  They used 1982 data from 42 four-digit SIC food manufacturing 
industries.  From this data they developed up-stream and down-stream matrices. The 
up-stream matrix represented the percentage of value that a particular industrys output 
had on all the industries it supplied. The down-stream matrix represented the percentage 
of value of a particular industrys demand had on the output of supplying industries.  
From this information they developed a vertical co-ordination index where zero 
represented spot markets and 1 represented vertical integration.  They then looked at 
four categories of transaction costs; uncertainty, concentration of buyers and sellers, 
                                                 
26 Hobbs (1996c), page 20. 
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asset specificity and cost of administration of vertical co-ordination.  Their vertical co-
ordination index then was regressed against proxies of these four transaction cost 
categories.  They concluded that transaction costs were the primary motivation for 
vertical co-ordination and that uncertainty, input supplier concentration, asset 
specificity and scale economies were the most influential transaction costs. 
Hobbs (1997) used survey data to determine the importance of transaction costs 
in United Kingdom producer decisions to market their cattle through auction markets or 
directly to packing plants.  Participants were asked to rate if they knew the value of 
their cattle before they went to auction (1-5), how much time they spent in finding 
which auction gave the best price, time spent in price discovery for direct sales and 
were they able to meet the quality specifications of the packing plant.  This information 
was used to measure the importance of search and information transaction costs in the 
vertical coordination decision. 
 Hobbs asked the following questions in order to measure the importance of 
negotiating and decision making transaction costs on vertical coordination decisions.  
The degree of difficulty in organizing the delivery of cattle directly to the packing plant 
compared to the auction market (1-5). The difference in transportation cost per animal 
between selling directly to the packing plant in contrast to marketing through the 
auction market. The difference in commissions paid by marketing through the auction 
market compared to selling directly to the plant. The difference in the number of days in 
receiving payment from selling through the auction market compared to direct to 
packing plant sales.  The impact of not having control over which order the cattle are 
sold in the auction market (1-5) since the order may impact the price received. The risk 
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of the cattle not getting sold in the auction because they did not reach the reserve bid 
price resulting in the cattle being transported back to the farm (1-5). The risk having to 
take the price the packer offers because they may be at a bargaining disadvantage (1-5).  
The frequency of auction sales held during the week so that cattle can be sold when they 
are ready for market. The time spent by farmers at auction markets. Were there 
sufficient numbers of buyers at the auction to allow for better competition (yes, no)?  
And did the farmer have a good relationship with the packing plant buyer (1-5).  
Hobbs then asked participants about the difference in shrink and carcass damage 
between selling to the auction market and directly to the packing plant (1-5). Finally she 
asked if grade uncertainty and grade information asymmetry had an impact on selling 
directly to the packing plant (1-5).  These questions were used to determine the 
importance of monitoring and enforcement transaction costs had on the vertical 
coordination decision. 
Hobbs then used a two-limit Tobit model to measure the impact of these 
transaction costs on the decision to sell to the auction market or directly to the packing 
plant.  She found that the greater the grade uncertainty the more likely the producer 
would sell through the auction market.  She further found that the more reliable the 
relationship with the packing plant buyer, the more time spent at the auction market, the 
greater the size of the lot being marketed, marketing bulls, the greater the degree that 
the producer followed animal welfare codes and the greater the risk of not getting a 
reserved price at the auction market made it more likely the producer would sell directly 
to the packing plant. Hobbs did not find that price uncertainty had significant impact on 
the decision to sell through the auction market or directly to the packing plant. 
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Hobbs (1996 b) investigated the impact of transaction costs on beef processors 
method of procurement. Here she uses a conjoint analysis to examine bundles of supply 
chain attributes where the processor is assumed be able to assess implicitly each 
attribute within the bundle in order to determine which supply chain has the greatest 
value. The transaction cost attributes examined were supply continuity, degree of 
animal handling during transportation, degree of traceability of animals and method of 
payment.  Payment was based on live weight versus dressed weight; traceability was 
described as either being easy or difficult; handling was determined as either handled 
once or more than once from farm to packing plants; and supply continuity was 
accessed at either occasional or regular.  Respondents were asked to evaluate ten supply 
chain bundles consisting of combinations of these attributes by scoring them from 1 to 9 
with 9 being the more preferred supply chain bundle.  Hobbs found that the most 
important attribute in determining the marketing channel for United Kingdom 
processors was traceability.  Traceability affects monitoring and enforcement costs. 
Supply consistency was the least important attribute. Method of payment and handling 
were preferred about the same with a slight preference given to method of payment. 
T. Schmitz et al. (2003) examined the impact of transaction costs on the 
marketing of stocker cattle in the United States.  They theorized that transaction costs 
may impact the choice of marketing channel. Schmitz et al. interviewed two livestock 
marketing experts from the top 15 beef-cow producing states.  These experts were asked 
to provide an opinion on the share of stocker cattle marketed in their state through 
auction sales, private sales, video auctions and internet auctions. They then compared 
the share of each marketing method using ordinary least squares with the share of 
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producers in each state that had herds over 500 cows.  They observed that the states 
with a larger share of large herds had a lower share of stocker cattle sold through the 
auction market.  That is, they found a positive correlation between herd size and the 
choice of marketing through private sales and video and internet auctions.  Schmitz et 
al. concluded that relatively larger producers were able to take advantage of new 
marketing innovations such as internet auctions because their transaction costs were 
lower.  Smaller producers were restricted to using auction markets because their 
transaction costs were higher if they were to use other marketing channels. 
None of these studies attempted to estimate the actual transaction costs.  Rather 
they looked to see if transaction costs had an impact on decisions that firms made and 
what transaction costs were important in making these decisions. The following chapter 
outlines a theoretical model to quantify transaction costs. 
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Chapter 4 
Theoretical Model 
 
In this chapter, transaction cost economic (TCE) theory will be combined with 
neoclassical economic theory to show the impact transaction costs have on the beef 
marketing chain relating to feedlots.  A method of defining fixed transaction costs and 
variable transaction costs will be developed in order to measure this impact.  The final 
section of this chapter will provide a method for placing a value on fixed and variable 
transaction costs. 
 
4.1 The Neoclassical Approach to the Vertical Beef Marketing Chain 
 
Figure 4.1 provides an example of the neoclassical approach to explain the beef 
marketing chain for Saskatchewan cattle by using a simple fixed proportion model.  It 
includes sectors from cow-calf production through to the slaughtering and processing 
sectors.  Q represents the number of live cattle at various weight ranges for each stage 
of the beef marketing chain.  SCC depicts the cow-calf supply curve, which is the sum of 
all the marginal cost curves of the cow-calf producers. The supply curve SCC is upward 
sloping because it reflects some scarcity of resources in the production process. For 
example, land used for pasture, hay, and silage in cow-calf production becomes scarce 
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over the long term. Good quality land is used first and as production increases poorer 
quality land is brought into use.  Good quality land produces more output per unit  
 
Figure 4.1: The Vertical Beef Marketing Chain  
 
of input; thus it has a higher value or rent than poorer quality land.  Cow-calf 
production must compete with other land uses, such as grain production. Grain is often 
at a competitive disadvantage with cow-calf production on lower quality land.  Hence 
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the tradition of Saskatchewan has been to use lower quality land for cow-calf 
production and higher quality land for grain production.  
As cow-calf production increases it must begin to use more expensive, higher 
quality land.  This results in an upward sloping supply curve for cow-calf production 
over the long run.  In a competitive situation, cow-calf producers receive price PCC for 
their calves and they receive the shaded area RCC (the area below PCC and above SCC) in 
the form of economic rents in terms of producer surplus. These economic rents accrue 
to the owners of the fixed factors of production such as land, breeding stock, and 
equipment over the short run and land over the long run.  Thus, over the long run, RCC 
represents the economic rents realized to land used in cow-calf production. 
 In the lower panel of Figure 4.1, ΣMCB, ΣMCF, and ΣMCP depict the sum of 
marginal cost curves for the backgrounding sector, finishing feedlot sector, and beef 
meat packing sector respectively.  These marginal cost curves are constructed such that 
they do not include the cost of supplying the input below them in the marketing chain.  
That is, the marginal cost for a firm in the backgrounding sector does not include the 
cost of buying calves from cow-calf producers, and the marginal cost for a firm in the 
meat packing sector does not include the cost of buying slaughter animals from the 
finishing feedlots.  In addition, the marginal cost curves become increasingly more 
elastic as one moves up the supply chain, thereby reflecting constant or increasing 
returns to size.  Finally, the marginal cost curves remain upward sloping in the 
backgrounding, finishing, and meat packing sectors to reflect the scarcity of resources 
that exist in these sectors.  For example, the backgrounding feedlots have marginal cost 
curves that slope upward because of the scarcity of land for pasture.  Finishing feedlots 
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have upward sloping marginal cost curves due to increasing transportation cost to 
access silage and manure removal as the feedlot gets larger as well as due to pollution 
regulations. Packing plants have upward sloping marginal cost curves because scarcity 
of labour.  Packing plants compete with other industries for labour. Therefore they 
would have to increase wage rates in order to attract increased labour resources from 
other industries. 
Each supply curve above SCC (in Figure 4.1) is the summation of that sectors 
marginal cost curves and its supplying sectors supply curve. For example, the supply 
curve for the backgrounding sector would be the sum of marginal cost curves for 
backgrounding (∑MCB) plus the supply of calves (SCC).  The intersection of the demand 
curve facing the packing plants (DP) and the packing plants supply curve (SP) gives rise 
to the quantity of beef demanded (QA) and the packing plants price (PP).  Assuming 
there is no death loss through the chain, at quantity demand QA each sectors supply 
curve gives rise to that sectors price (PB, PF and PCC).  The marketing margin for each 
level of the supply chain (PB*, PF* and PP*) is simply that sectors price, less the price 
paid by that sector for live cattle.  For example, the marketing margin for the meat 
packing sector (PP*) is the packers average price received for all the products it 
produces from the live animals (PP) less the price it pays for slaughtered animals (PF).  
Therefore RB, RF, and RP reflect the additional rents accruing to firms in that respective 
sector.  For example, the additional economic rents accruing to firms in the meat 
packing sector (RP) is the area below (PP*) and above that sectors sum of marginal cost 
curves (ΣMCP).   The total economic rents accruing to the beef industry are the sum of 
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the economic rents for the meat packing, finishing and backgrounding sectors (RP, RF, 
and RB) plus RCC, which is equal to the area under PP and above SP. 
In a competitive situation there is a derived demand curve for each sector below 
the meat packing sector that is not shown in figure 4.1.  Each sectors demand curve 
would intersect that sectors supply curve at QA. These derived demand curves would 
be the demand curve faced by the packing sector less the sum of marginal cost curves of 
the sectors above the sector in question.  For example the derived demand for finished 
animals would be the packing plants demand curve (DP) less the sum of the meat 
packing sectors marginal cost curves (ΣMCP).  Or to view it another way, the derived 
demand for finished animals would be the packing plants demand curve (DP) less the 
vertical difference between the packing sectors supply curve (SP) and the finishing 
sectors supply curve (SF).  
The model shown in Figure 4.1 can be used to describe a competitive market 
where the various segments of the industry are under different ownership.  However, 
Figure 4.1 can also depict the decomposition of rents within an integrated market or 
sub-market.  For example, in the US sugar industry, some of the large producers are 
integrated from production through the selling of refined sugar (Moss and Schmitz, 
2002).  With reference to figure 4.1, if packing plants were integrated with finishing 
feedlots either through contractual arrangements or ownership, then RP would represent 
the economic rents accruing to the packing plant enterprise and RF would be the 
economic rents accruing to the finishing feedlot enterprise.  
Under neoclassical economic theory, once economic rents are identified it is 
possible to determine if a rent seeking activity such as exercising market power is 
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occurring either in the input or output markets or both.  Neoclassical economic theory 
further indicates when price is greater than marginal cost there is an inefficient 
economic solution. That is there no longer is a competitive situation and at least one 
firm within a sector is rent seeking through exercising its market power.  Any rent 
seeking activities by firms within a sector could impact the ability for future expansion 
in that sector from outside investors because these firms would try to drive out other 
firms in order to further increase their market share and thus their market power. 
 
4.2 Transaction Costs within the Vertical Beef Marketing Chain 
 
 Coase (1937 and 1960), Williamson (1986) and others indicate that the 
exclusion of transaction costs in neoclassical economic theory could lead to an 
erroneous conclusion about market efficiency. That is one may conclude that market 
power is being exercised when it is not.  
This can be shown by again returning to a simple fixed proportion model only 
with one sector of the vertical beef market chain with transactions costs.  This is 
illustrated in figure 4.2.  Here the neoclassical supply curve is shown as SN which gives 
rise to price and quantity PN and QN respectively.  The economic rents accruing to the 
supplier (producer surplus) are then equal to the triangle abc. However once transaction 
costs are taken into consideration the supply curve shifts upward to ST.  Now the 
competitive solution with the transaction cost supply curve ST gives rise to price PT and 
quantity QT. The economic rents accruing to the supplier are the triangle deg.   
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 Figure 4.2 A Beef Sector with Transaction Costs 
 
If transaction costs were not taken into account and the observed price and 
quantity are PT and QT respectively, then the neoclassical economist would conclude 
that the market is not economically efficient.  This economist would note a loss of 
efficiency equal to the triangle ghc and the supplier would accrue extra economic rents 
equal to the rectangle dafg less the triangle fhc.  In other words this economist would 
conclude that there is rent seeking behaviour when in fact there is not. 
 The remainder of this section will be dedicated to developing the theoretical 
optimum output for firms in the packing plant, order buyer and feedlot sectors 
incorporating transaction costs.  The perfect knowledge and homogeneous output 
assumptions are being relaxed here in order to incorporate transaction costs into the 
competitive model. This implies that the buyers or sellers are not fully aware of the 
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attributes of the animals they purchase and market.  The price paid will reflect quality 
differences to the extent these attributes can be identified. However these quality 
differences can allow for some opportunistic behaviour for both buyers and sellers. 
Therefore transaction costs represent the cost of transacting business in purchasing and 
selling live cattle. 
Equation 4.1 gives the profit function of a firm in the meat packing sector for 
period t, which shows the market relationship between the meat packing sector and the 
finishing feedlot sector by including transaction costs.  For the purposes of this 
discussion period t is defined as one year. 
FTCFPCZwxTwnxTwnQP tttZtjtjtjtjtititititttt −−−+−+−= )()(π
 (4.1) 
The packing plant receives finished cattle from two finishing feedlots, i and j 
during the year. One could also look at these as two types of feedlots, large and small 
feedlots. In this case, feedlot i represents larger feedlots while feedlot j represents 
smaller feedlots.  Qt is the packing plants output during the year that includes beef, 
offal, hide and other by-products in processing a finished animal.  Pt is the combined 
per animal annual average value for the packing plants output Qt.  Inputs xit and xjt are 
finished animals purchased annually from feedlots i and j respectively. The packing 
plant purchases nit and njt number of finished animals during the year at an average 
annual purchase price of wit and wjt per animal from the respective feedlots.  The terms 
Tit and Tjt are the marginal transaction costs that the packing plant incurs annually with 
the respective feedlots. Thus, the actual cost to the packing plant for obtaining each 
animal is its purchase price plus the marginal transaction costs associated with obtaining 
that animal from a particular feedlot. The packing plant purchases all other inputs Zt at a 
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cost of wzt. The packing plant also experiences annual fixed production costs (FPCt) and 
fixed transaction costs (FTCt). 
Equation 4.2 is the assumed production function of the packing plant. Here the 
output of the packing plant, in terms of weight, is equal to the total weight of the live 
cattle purchased by the plant.  This simplifying assumption means the plant uses all the 
animals purchased with out any loss and that the plant adds nothing to the product other 
than the service of killing, separating and packaging of live cattle into beef carcasses, 
boxed beef, hide, offal etc.  
xnxnQ jtjtititt +=  (4.2) 
Packing plants will only buy live cattle from the feedlots thus by combining 
equations 4.1 and 4.2 with a non-negative constraint on inputs xit and xjt results in the 
following Lagrange function: 
ZwxTwnxTwnxnxnP tZtjtjtjtjtititititjtjtitittt −+−+−+= )()( )(lπ  
)0()0( xxFTCFPC jtjititt −+−+− − λλ  
The first order conditions with respect to output are as follows: 
λ iititt TwP ++=  
λ jjtjtt TwP ++=  
0== xitiλ  
0== x jtjλ  
And the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are: 
0)]([* =+− Twx ititit P  
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0)]([* =+− Twx jtjtjt P  
0]0[* =− xitiλ  
0]0[* =− xjtjλ  
Since, the packing plants take cattle from both feedlots as a result of the non-
negative constraint then xit and xjt are positive, λi  and λ j  are zero, and the following 
equations hold: 
TwP ititt +=  (4.3) 
TwP jtjtt +=  (4.4) 
Thus, the optimum number of cattle purchased from each feedlot is when the 
combined price per animal of the plants output equals the purchase price per animal 
and the marginal transaction costs for that respective feedlot.  The purchase price per 
animal is the marginal production cost from a particular feedlot. The marginal value 
product is equal to Pt, which implies that the marginal physical product is one for both 
feedlots.  This result is not surprising because equation 4.2 indicates that any change in 
the number of animals purchased from either feedlot will result in an equal change in 
the amount of output produced by the packing plant.  Finally, the difference between the 
prices paid for cattle from the feedlots is the difference between their respective 
marginal transaction costs as expressed in equation 4.5. 
TTww jtitjtit −=−  (4.5) 
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The second level of business relationships that a finishing feedlot has in the beef 
marketing chain is with order buyers or cattle brokers. As described earlier in chapter 2, 
order buyers play an important role in the interface between feedlots and cow-calf 
producers.  They act as purchasing agents at auction markets and market reporters for 
the feedlot owners. The annual profit function for the order buyer is provided in 
equation 4.6. 
xTcnxrnxrn OBitOBitOBitOBitOBtjtjOBjtOBititOBitOBt )( +−+=π  
FTCFPCxTcn OBtOBtOBjtOBjtOBjtOBjt −−+− )(  (4.6) 
Where: 
π OBt  is an order buyers annual profit function. 
xOBit  is the live animal bought for and sold to feedlot i during the year. 
xOBjt  is the live animal bought for and sold to feedlot j during the year, 
nOBit  is the number of animals bought for and sold annually to feedlot i. 
nOBjt  is the number of animals bought for and sold annually to feedlot j. 
rit      is the price charged to feedlot i for xOBit  during the year. 
r jt      is the price charged to feedlot j for xOBjt  during the year. 
cOBit    is the annual average variable production cost of the order buyer that is the same  
 as the annual marginal production cost for acquiring xOBit  that includes the  
 purchase price of the animal, auction market commissions, feeding and  
 transportation costs on the cattle, wages paid to buyers and other operating  
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 expenses incurred by the order buyer. The order buyers commission usually is  
 intended to cover wages and operating expenses. 
cOBjt    is the annual average variable production cost of the order buyer that is the same 
 as the annual marginal production cost for acquiring xOBjt . The annual marginal 
 production cost is similar to that described for cOBit .   
 T OBit  is the annual marginal transaction costs that the order buyer has with feedlot i,. 
T OBjt  is the annual marginal transaction costs that the order buyer has with feedlot  j 
 and 
FPCOBt  and FTCOBt  are the annual fixed production and transaction costs of the 
         order buyer. 
Here the initial assumptions are the same as those for packing plants with an 
additional assumption that the order buyer only purchases enough animals to fill the 
orders of feedlots i and j. 
The first order conditions with respect to output are: 
Tcr OBitOBitit +=  (4.7) 
Tcr OBjtOBjtjt +=  (4.8) 
Thus, the optimum price for the order buyer to charge to a feedlot is the 
marginal production cost for acquiring the cattle plus the marginal transaction costs 
with that feedlot. Therefore, the difference between the prices charged to the feedlots 
would be the difference between the respective marginal production cost of acquiring 
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the cattle and the marginal transaction costs the order buyer has with that respective 
feedlot as outlined in equation 4.9. 
TTccrr OBjtOBitOBjtOBitjtit −−−=−  (4.9) 
If the marginal production costs are assumed to be the same, then the difference 
between the prices charged to the feedlots is the difference in their respective marginal 
transaction costs. 
The finishing feedlots profit functions are the only remaining profit functions 
that need to be defined in order to explain the beef marketing chain around feedlots.  
Equation 4.10 is a generic feedlot annual profit function. 
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Where: 
πFt      is an annual finishing feedlot profit. 
∑
=
a
1a
   is the sum of all the packing plants the feedlot sells to where a=1,,a. 
∑
=
b
1b
 is the sum of all the order buyers the feedlot buys from where b=1,,b. 
nPat     is the number of slaughter animals sold annually to packing plant a. 
nOBbt     is the number of feeder animals bought annually from order buyer b. 
xt  is the feeder animal purchased then sold as a slaughter animal during the year. 
C )(t xn tbt  are all the annual production costs incurred by  the feedlot in changing a 
feeder animal into a finished one. These costs are a function of the size of the 
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feedlot and include costs such as feed, facilities, equipment, animal health and 
labour. 
wPat  is the price received by the feedlot for its slaughter animals that were sold to 
packing plant a during the year. 
rOBbt  is the price paid by the feedlot for its feeder cattle that were bought from order 
buyer b during the year. 
T Pat  is the annual marginal transaction costs that the feedlot has with packing plant 
a and 
T OBbt  is the annual marginal transaction costs that the feedlot has with order buyer b. 
 
Note that the transaction costs for selling the animals to the packing plant are 
kept on the revenue side of equation 4.10, which is contrary to convention.  This was 
done to illustrate that the net revenue the feedlot receives from the packing plant is the 
price the feedlot receives for the animal less the marginal transaction costs with the 
packing plant.  
Again the assumptions for the finishing feedlot profit function are the same as 
those for the packing plants with the additional assumption that the number of animals 
sold are equal to the number of animals purchased.  That is ∑∑
==
=
b
1b
OB
bt
a
1a
P
at nn , which 
means any death loss incurred is included inC )(t xn tbt .  Therefore equation 4.10 can be 
rewritten as shown in equation 4.11 by substituting ∑
=
b
1b
OB
btn  for ∑
=
a
1a
P
atn . 
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Then the first order condition with respect to xt is: 
cTrTw tOBbt
OB
bt
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Here ct is the annual marginal cost of production.  Equation 4.12 is the result of 
rearranging the costs so that they are on the right hand side. 
TTcrw PatOBbttOBbtPat +++=  (4.12) 
Thus the optimum level of output for the feedlot is where the feedlots total 
marginal costs of production plus its total marginal transaction costs equals the price 
paid by the packing plant for an animal.  Here the total marginal costs of production are 
equal to the price paid for the feeder animal plus the marginal cost of getting that animal 
to a finished weight ( cr tOBbt + ) and the total marginal transaction costs are the sum of 
the marginal transaction costs for buying and selling the animal ( TT PatOBbt + ). 
Figure 4.3 illustrates one element of the vertical market chain, namely the 
feedlot cost structure. The bottom panel shows the average transaction cost (ATC) and 
marginal transaction cost (MTC) curves for the feedlot.  It is assumed that the 
transaction costs have increasing returns to size.  The middle panel illustrates the 
average production cost (APC) and marginal production cost (MPC) curves.  The 
production curves are drawn to show all three cost phases, increasing returns to size that 
is to the left of QA, constant returns to size that is the flat portion to the right of  QA  and 
decreasing returns to size that is the upward sloping portion of the average production 
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cost curve and includes  Q*.  The top panel is the vertical sum of the bottom two panels 
resulting in the total average cost (TAC) and total marginal cost (TMC) curves. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Feedlot Cost Structure 
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The optimum output under neoclassical competitive economic theory would be 
where price equals marginal cost and the optimum level of production occurs where the 
average cost curve is minimized. Here the marginal production cost equals the average 
production cost and economic profits are zero. Thus optimum production is anywhere 
along the flat portion of the average cost and marginal cost curves. If production were to 
the left of QA then the feedlot would experience an economic loss because the marginal 
cost is below the average cost.  So the feedlot would be encouraged to increase its size 
in order to eliminate this economic loss.  Where marginal production cost is greater than 
average production cost the feedlot experiences an economic profit, however an 
economic profit encourages other firms to enter into the feedlot sector resulting in 
increased production and lower prices.  The resulting long run optimum level of 
production occurs when the marginal cost equals to average cost.  Anecdotal evidence 
from discussion with feedlot managers indicate that the majority of economies of size 
have already occurred when feedlots are between 10,000 and 15,000 head one time 
capacity.  Discussions with the manager of the largest single feedlot in Alberta that has 
a one time capacity of 75,000 head suggest that it is unclear if further expansion would 
result in inefficiencies. He suggested that any inefficiency would not be to production 
issues but due to environmental regulations and public displeasure with intensive 
livestock operations.  
There is a different optimum when transaction costs are taken into account.  
Here the marginal transaction cost (MTC) curve is below the average transaction costs 
(ATC) curve at all quantities due to increasing returns to size.  The optimum level of 
production would occur where the increase in efficiency due to size in transaction costs 
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is just offset by the decrease in production efficiency due to size.  That is the decrease in 
average transaction costs is equal to the increase in average production costs.  In figure 
4.3 this point is reached at Q* where the sum of average transaction costs and average 
production costs are minimized.  Here the change in total average cost is zero 
( 0=
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
Q
TAC
Q
ATC
Q
APC ) and total marginal cost equals the total average cost 
( TACTMC = ) which means that their sums are equal 
(i.e. MTCMPCATCAPC +=+ ).  Therefore at quantity Q* the marginal transaction 
cost is below the average transaction cost curve and the marginal production cost is 
above the average production curve. Also at quantity Q* the respective marginal cost 
curves give rise to price PT and PP and their sum equals to the optimum price P* 
(i.e. PPP TP +=* ).  
It is clear that any calculation based on only production cost analysis would 
suggest that feedlots would be exercising market power or rent seeking because they are 
experiencing economic profits since the price they receive would be great than the 
optimum production price ( PP Pf* ) or in other words the price they receive would be 
greater than marginal cost ( MPCP f* ). The same argument can be made for firms 
in the meat packing sector and order buyer firms. 
Therefore the difference between the profits of a large and a small feedlot is the 
difference between the prices each feedlot receives for is animals and the price paid for 
these animal, the cost of finishing and total transaction costs for selling and acquiring 
the animals. Equation 4.13 gives the difference in profits between feedlots i and j 
operating at optimum capacity. 
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)(( ) ATCAPCPnATCAPCPn jtjtjtitititjtit −−−−−− =ππ  (4.13) 
 
4.3 Calculating Transaction Costs 
 
To this point total transaction costs has not been fully defined other than to 
indicate that feedlots have two sets of transaction costs, one set on the demand side and 
the other set on the supply side.  This section will define transaction costs for a finishing 
feedlot. Transaction cost theory indicates that there are search and information costs, 
monitoring and enforcement costs as well as negotiating and decision making costs.  
These costs are impacted by the level of trust between the participants, uncertainty and 
the frequency of transactions transacted by the participants. The frequency of 
transactions is based on the marketing strategy of the feedlot.  The marketing strategy 
chosen by the feedlot is based on the size of feedlot, willingness to take risk and the 
ability of the feedlot to access capital and conditions placed on the acquisition of this 
capital.  These conditions and ability to access capital are based upon the relative wealth 
of the feedlot and its managements skills in accessing capital. 
Annual total transaction costs (TTCt) would have both a fixed transaction costs 
(FTCt) component and a variable transaction costs (VTCt) component (equation 4.14).  
Any investment into establishing a business relationship with an order buyer and 
packing plant prior to the current year would be the fixed cost component and any 
current annual cost regarding the transacting of business would be the variable cost. 
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VTCFTCTTC ttt +=   (4.14) 
There are two elements in recognizing the fixed cost in the business relationship; 
the cost of losing the existing business relationship and the cost of strengthening the 
existing business relationship. The cost of losing the existing business relationship is 
similar to an opportunity cost while the cost of strengthening the existing business 
relationship is similar to good will. 
The first element is the cost of losing the business relationship (α).  That is the 
cost of not being able to sell or buy because one of the partners in the business 
relationship has chosen to discontinue the business relationship.  For example if feedlot 
X no longer has a business relationship with a certain packing plant, then there is the 
cost of establishing a new business relationship with another packing plant as well as 
the actual cost of losing the business relationship with the old plant. The actual cost of 
losing a business relationship could include the inability to meet the quality 
requirements of another packing plant or at least extra costs to meet these requirements 
and reduced prices because it is now placing extra supplies into that packing plant. 
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In equation 4.15 the cost of losing a business relationship (α) is equal to the cost 
of establishing a new business relationship which includes initial search and 
information costs (SI), negotiation and decision making costs (NI) and monitoring and 
enforcement costs (MI). Plus the actual cost of losing the business relationship that is a 
function of the sum of periods (u) and the product of the opportunity cost of replacing 
the business relationship per transaction (ρt), the number of transactions per year (mt), 
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and the number of years in each period (Lu). Thus, the cost of losing a business relations 
(α) is accumulated over the lifetime of the business relationship.  
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 where V=0,1,,V. (4.16) 
Equation 4.16 defines the second element to the fixed cost component. It is the 
cost of strengthening the business relationship which shall be defined as the current 
years stock of capital trust (Kt).  In equation 4.16 the stock of capital trust is a function 
of the accumulated discounted trust components over the life of the business 
relationship.  The trust component is the product of the value of trust placed on each 
transaction (βt-v) and the annual frequency of transactions (mt-v).  The trust component 
is discounted by D percent over V years.  Here V is the number of years from the current 
year throughout the length of the business relationship. The trust component is 
discounted to reflect that recent experience is more valuable than trust gained in the 
distant past.  However, the discount rate, D, could be relatively low.  The size of βt-v and 
the discount factor D will determine the relative importance of the annual trust 
component in the stock of capital trust (Kt). The inclusion of the discount factor results 
in the stock of capital trust reaching an optimum at some point in the future.  The stock 
of capital trust is expressed in functional form because it is not clear to what degree the 
level of trust is adjusted by the frequency of transactions. That is if there are twice as 
many transactions will the trust double or will the increase in trust exhibit decreasing or 
increasing returns to frequency of transactions? The stock of capital trust (Kt) is 
accumulated throughout the life of the business relationship similarly to the cost of 
losing the business relationship (α). 
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Beef animals have a greater degree of asset specificity (sometimes referred to 
time specificity) as they go up the market chain.  That is the cow-calf producer can 
always choose to retain ownership of his/her calves if the price is not acceptable, 
however once the animals are finished the older they get before slaughter the less 
valuable they become.  So once the animals are finished there is a relatively short 
window of time to dispose of this asset.  The packing plant also has a degree of supply 
risk.  If they are unable to get sufficient supplies of the right quality, they face 
inefficiencies or shut down costs. So in the case of the packing plant, management will 
either take animals that do not meet their quality requirements, get more aggressive in 
the market or both. This degree of asset specificity and risk allow for opportunistic 
behaviour, thus transaction costs. 
Transaction cost theory indicates that transaction costs are inversely related to 
trust.  So as trust increases the cost of doing business decreases.  This theory also 
indicates that transaction costs are directly related to uncertainty.  That is not being able 
to meet supplies is costly.  So the ability to develop a trustworthy relationship reduces 
that risk. Thus total fixed transaction costs are the cost of losing the business 
relationship discounted by the stock of capital trust as shown in equation 4.17. 
KFTC t
t
t +
=
1
α  (4.17) 
Equation 4.18 outlines the variable transaction costs. The variable transaction 
costs are the sum of the search and information costs (St), negotiating and decision 
making costs (Nt) and monitoring and enforcement costs (Mt) throughout the year.  The 
total negotiating and decision making cost is related to the frequency (mt) of 
93 
transactions during the year. If there is more than one contract per year then these costs 
are adjusted accordingly. 
MNmSVTC ttttt ++=  (4.18) 
Here the search and information costs will probably be zero unless the partners 
wish to improve their contractual relationship.  The negotiation and decision making 
costs may include price discovery, time of delivery, quality and method and timing of 
payment.  The monitoring and enforcement costs will have an annual cost element for 
monitoring the contract σct and a cost element of monitoring each animal σnt throughout 
the year as expressed in equation 4.19.  Here recall that nt is the number of animals 
purchased and sold during the year. 
σσ nttCtt nM +=  (4.19) 
Now substitute equation 4.19 into 4.18 results in equation 4.20. 
σσ nttCttttt nNmSVTC +++=  (4.20) 
Equation 4.21 is the result of substituting equations 4.17 and 4.20 into equation 
4.14. 
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Now it is possible to calculate the average transaction costs and marginal 
transaction costs as outlined in equations 4.22 and 4.23 respectively.  
n
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Equations 4.21 and 4.23 provide the mathematical structure to test the 
hypothesis as outlined earlier that transaction costs result in large feedlots paying less 
for their feeder animals and receiving a higher price for their slaughter animals. 
 
4.4 Measuring Transaction Costs 
 
This section provides a method of measuring transaction costs for the packing 
plant, feedlot and order buyer sectors. 
 Table 4.1 provides a list of potential search and information costs faced by a 
packing plant doing business with a finishing feedlot.  The existence of a business 
relationship would suggest that there is a cost in not having that business relationship.  
The cost of not having a business relationship with a feedlot could include the cost of 
lower quality animals, the cost of getting aggressive in the market place to guarantee 
supplies, the cost of inefficiency if supplies are short and the cost of shutting down. 
The packing plant incurs a cost to find a potential feedlot with which to develop 
a relationship in order to obtain a reliable supply.  Initially, the packing plant would 
determine in advance what characteristics they are looking for in an ideal feedlot. 
These characteristics could include the ability to meet the quantity and quality 
requirements of the plant, proximity, whether the feedlot is trustworthy and can the 
business relationship be sustained for a long time. 
Proximity to the plant could impact transportation cost and quality. The feedlot 
needs to be trustworthy to reduce future monitoring and enforcement costs. Finally, the 
business relationship has to have the potential to last a long time.  This means the 
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feedlot needs to be able to face future changes and still be able to survive. Factors that 
could impact the sustainability of the relationship may be the management structure, 
financial strength of the feedlot and its business structure. 
Table 4.1: Packing Plant’s Search and Information Costs with a Feedlot 
Identified Cost Method of measuring 
A) Fixed Cost 
i) Cost of not having a major supplier 
• Potential loss in quality of 
animals supplied, extra cost of 
going into the market place to 
obtain supplies, cost of inability 
to obtain supplies. 
ii) Determine characteristics of a good 
feedlot. 
i) Able to meet supply requirements 
continuous and ample supply, able 
to meet quality requirements and 
adaptable  
ii) Proximity 
iii) Able to sustain a relationship- 
management, business structure, 
and financial strength. 
iv) Trustworthy 
iii) Search for potential feedlot partner 
iv) Search out incentives to encourage 
feedlot to be a partner such as in 
price, delivery and/or payment. 
v) Value of trust gained by each 
transaction  
 
B) Variable Cost 
i) Ongoing search to improve the 
relationship. 
 
 
 
Loss of opportunity cost.  Find out cost 
of poor quality per animal.  Find cost of 
shutting down.  Find cost of loss of 
efficiency.  Find cost of getting 
aggressive in the market. 
Personnel time and equipment  
 
Personnel time and equipment  
 
 
 
Extra transportation cost 
Personnel time and equipment  
 
 
Personnel time and equipment  
Personnel time and equipment  
Personnel time and equipment  
 
 
Personnel time and equipment  
Constant, increasing or decreasing 
levels of trust per transaction 
 
Personnel time and equipment  
 
 
Once the characteristics of the ideal feedlot are determined then the packing 
plant would search for feedlots that best meet these criteria.  This may take time and 
effort, which implies there will be some cost attached to this search. 
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Once the number of candidates is narrowed down to a one or two potential 
partners then there will be a cost incurred in identifying ways to encourage that feedlot 
to enter into the business relationship.  The business relationship must be mutually 
beneficial or it will not be sustainable. This may include pricing options, delivery 
options and payment schemes. At this stage the search is for a range of options. 
Assuming each transaction increases the level of trust, then to what degree is 
this trust increased?  That is, do increased transactions result in constant, increasing or 
decreasing returns to trust such that if transactions are doubled will the level of trust be 
doubled? 
There may be an ongoing cost of searching for better alternatives to improve the 
contract such that both parties are not worse off and at least one is better off. This would 
be the variable cost component of information and search costs. It is expected that this 
cost will be relatively small and may be zero with mature relationships. 
Table 4.2 outlines the packing plants possible negotiating and decision making 
costs with a feedlot.  Once a decision is made to pursue a potential partner then the next 
stage is to negotiate with them so that an agreement can be reached.  Here they haggle 
on the price discovery mechanism, pricing and delivery and payment options.  Is the 
price based on CanFax information or will it be adjusted to Chicago Board of Trade 
prices?  How will quality be determined?  Is the price based on live weight, rail grade or 
grid?  Who is responsible for injury during transportation?  The packing plant will need 
to spend resources on personnel and equipment to do the negotiations. 
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Table 4.2: Packing Plant’s Negotiating and Decision Making Costs with a  
       Feedlot 
Identified Cost Method of Measuring 
A) Fixed cost  initial price discovery, 
haggling on price and delivery 
coordination. 
B) Variable cost ongoing price discovery, 
and possible ongoing haggling on 
price and delivery coordination. 
Personnel time and equipment  
 
 
Personnel time and equipment  
 
 
 
The potential monitoring and enforcement transaction costs that the packing 
plant may have with a feedlot are summarized in table 4.3.  The packing plant may have 
an initial investment in personnel time and equipment to set up how they will monitor 
the progress of the arrangement with the feedlot as well as monitor contractual issues.  
Then there will be the ongoing cost of recording information on quality and delivery of 
animals and relay this information to the feedlot.  Human resources and equipment such 
as computers, telephones and faxes will be needed to ensure that proper record keeping 
and communication takes place.   
Table 4.3: Packing Plant’s Monitoring and Enforcement Costs with a Feedlot 
Identified Cost Method of measuring 
A) Fixed cost  Initial cost of setting 
up a monitoring system to track 
quality and delivery times of 
animals and contract obligations. 
B) Variable cost  On going cost of 
monitoring deliveries and quality 
of animals as well as contract 
obligations 
 
Personnel time and equipment  
 
 
 
Personnel time and equipment  
 
 
 
Table 4.4 gives the potential search and information costs the order buyer may 
have with a feedlot.  Initially the order buyer must develop and maintain a good 
reputation in order to attract business. Order buyers have payment risk because after 
98 
they receive an order for cattle they then purchase these cattle before reselling them to 
the feedlot.  Order buyers need to know they will get paid when they deliver the cattle 
and that the customer recognizes that market conditions may not allow the order buyer 
to meet the quality standards that the feedlot manager has requested.  If the feedlot 
rejects the cattle then the order buyer has to take the cattle back to another location and 
incurs additional transportation costs.  If the order buyer can not find another feedlot to 
take the cattle immediately then the order buyer will incur extra carrying and feed 
charges.  A check on the feedlots reputation for paying its suppliers and its 
management capabilities are required.  Once the business relationship is established 
with a feedlot, how much trust is gained with each transaction? 
Table 4.4: Order Buyer’s Search and Information Costs with a Feedlot  
Identified Cost Method of Measuring 
A) Fixed cost-  
i) Cost of not having a long 
term customer 
ii) Initial cost in finding a 
customer and informing 
them of the service. 
iii) Gain a reputation and 
develop trust with feedlot 
with each negotiation 
 
B) Variable cost  
i) Price discovery  
 
Loss of opportunity 
 
Personnel time and equipment costs on 
background checks, ability to pay, 
reputation etc. 
Personnel time and equipment  
Constant, increasing or decreasing levels 
of trust per transaction 
 
 
Personnel time 
 
The variable search and information costs faced by the order buyer would be 
determining if they are still competitive with other order buyers.  Otherwise they would 
lose customers.  Once they lose customers it would take a greater investment of time 
and effort to re-establish their reputation. 
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Table 4.5 outlines the order buyers potential negotiating and decision making 
costs.  The fixed negotiating and decision making costs are not likely to be significant 
because it would be simply determining the level of service required.  The market 
generally establishes the commission fees. The variable costs are how many animals to 
order at what quality and price, negotiating when payment is made and when the cattle 
are delivered.  The costs here would likely be communication costs such as phone, fax, 
e-mail and human resource time. 
Table 4.5:  Order Buyer’s Negotiating and Decision Making Costs with a 
          Feedlot 
Identified Cost Method of Measuring 
A) Fixed cost  Initial communicate 
cost of service 
B) Variable cost- haggling price 
ordering and delivery time 
Personnel time and equipment  
 
Personnel time and equipment  
 
 
Table 4.6 gives the order buyers potential monitoring and enforcement costs.  
The fixed cost portion would be the cost of setting up the monitoring system.  The 
variable cost is monitoring how many cattle are rejected by the feedlot and if payments 
are made on time and in the proper way.  The record keeping is part of the licensing, 
bonding requirements as well as requirements of U.S. customs officials for cattle sold 
into the U.S. The cost here would be human resource time, equipment and software for 
record keeping and communications. 
Table 4.6: Order Buyer’s Monitoring and Enforcement Costs with a Feedlot. 
Identified Cost Method of Measuring 
A) Fixed Cost  Setting up monitoring 
system  
B) Variable Cost -Monitoring 
payment and number of cattle 
rejected and maintaining records as 
part of licensing and bonding 
requirements 
Personnel time and equipment  
 
Personnel time and equipment  
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The finishing feedlot would have similar transaction cost as does the order buyer 
and the packing plant.  Table 4.7 provides the information and search cost that the 
feedlot would have with the packing plant and order buyer.  In terms of fixed 
information and search cost the feedlot may need to ensure a market for its finished 
animals with the packing plant and ensure a supply of quality animals from its order 
buyers.  To do this the feedlot would search out the packing plants and order buyers that 
would best fit its needs. It is possible that the feedlot could acquire its cattle directly 
from the cow-calf producer thereby circumventing the auction market and order buyers. 
Direct purchases from the cow-calf producer would eliminate commission fees from the 
order buyer and auction market in addition to reducing the extra transportation cost 
associated with the auction market. 
However, direct sales would have other transaction costs in terms of price-
discovery, market information and searching for cattle. The order buyer provides the 
feedlot with market information and does the search for appropriate cattle for a fee.  So 
does the services the order buyer provides the feedlot offset the extra cost?  Anecdotal 
evidence would suggest they do.  That is the very fact that order buyers are still part of 
the market place indicates that they are more efficient at acquiring cattle than the feedlot 
is.  The feedlots variable search and information costs may be the cost associated with 
searching for ways to improve the business arrangement.  
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Table 4.7: Feedlot’s Search and Information Costs with a Packing Plant 
        and Order Buyer 
Identified Cost Method of measuring 
A) Fixed Cost 
i) Cost of not having a major market 
• Potential loss of recognized 
value of the quality of animals 
supplied, cost of going into the 
market place and receiving a 
lower price, cost of delayed 
sales. 
ii) Cost of having to buy own cattle 
rather than going through and order 
buyer or cost of finding another 
order buyer, cost of not getting 
financing. 
iii) Search for right packing plant that 
is able to take animals when they 
are ready at specific quality is close 
and is trustworthy. 
iv) Search for order buyer that gives 
good advice on the market 
conditions, able to buy the animals 
desired at a reasonable price and is 
prompt in responding to the order 
and obtaining reasonable financing. 
v) Search out incentives to encourage 
packing plant to become a partner 
such as in price, delivery and/or 
payment. 
vi) Value of trust gained by each 
transaction  
B) Variable Cost 
i) Ongoing search to improve the 
relationship. 
 
 
 
Loss of opportunity cost.   
 
 
 
 
 
Personnel time and equipment  
 
 
 
 
Personnel time and equipment  
 
 
 
Personnel time and equipment  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Personnel time and equipment  
 
 
Constant, increasing or decreasing 
levels of trust per transaction 
 
Personnel time and equipment  
 
 
Tables 4.8 and 4.9 give the negotiating and decision making costs and 
monitoring and enforcement costs that the feedlot may have with packing plants and 
order buyers.  These costs are similar to those discussed regarding the packing plants 
business relationship with a feedlot and the order buyers business ties with a feedlot. 
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Table 4.8: Feedlot’s Negotiating and Decision Making Costs with a Packing 
         Plant and Order Buyer 
Identified Cost Method of Measuring 
A) Fixed cost  
i) Initial price discovery, haggling on 
price and delivery coordination 
with feedlot. 
ii) Initial price discovery with order 
buyer 
B) Variable cost  
i) Ongoing price discovery, and 
possible ongoing haggling on price 
and delivery coordination with 
packing plant 
ii) Ongoing price discovery, and 
haggling on price and delivery of 
cattle with order buyer 
 
Personnel time and equipment  
 
 
Personnel time and equipment  
 
 
Personnel time and equipment  
 
 
 
Personnel time and equipment  
 
 
Table 4.9: Feedlot’s Monitoring and Enforcement Costs with a Packing 
        Plant and Order Buyer 
Identified Cost Method of measuring 
A) Fixed cost  Initial cost of setting 
up a monitoring system to track 
quality and delivery times of 
animals and contract obligations. 
B) Variable cost  On going cost of 
monitoring deliveries and quality 
of animals as well as contract 
obligations 
 
Personnel time and equipment  
 
 
 
Personnel time and equipment  
 
 
This chapter has developed the theoretical framework to measure transaction 
costs of buying and selling cattle around the feedlot sector.  Surveying personnel from 
feedlots, packing plants and order buyer firms will be the preferred method of obtaining 
these costs.  The following chapter will outline how the survey will be conducted and 
the empirical results of this survey.  
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Chapter 5 
Empirical Methodology 
 
This chapter will outline how the transaction costs for buying and selling cattle 
were calculated for feedlots. These costs include fixed and variable transaction costs for 
the interface between feedlots and order buyers and between feedlots and packing 
plants. In addition there will be reference to the impact transaction costs have on the 
price that packing plants offer for cattle. 
 
5.1 Survey Methodology 
 
In 2003, eight Saskatchewan feedlot managers and personnel from three western 
Canadian packing plants were interviewed. The eight feedlots accounted for over 70 
percent of the finishing capacity in Saskatchewan and the three packing plants had over 
90 percent of the slaughtering capacity in western Canada.  
Earlier interviews with an order buyer and 17 feedlot managers indicated that 
feedlots were charged the same price for the services of their order buyers.  However, 
these earlier interviews also indicated that there was a difference in the type of service a 
feedlot received from its order buyer.  Therefore it was decided that the feedlot 
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managers would best be able to assess the level of service they received from their order 
buyers so it was not necessary to interview order buyers27. 
Seven of the eight feedlots finished animals while the eighth exclusively 
backgrounded animals. The backgrounding feedlot was added to the feedlot interview 
list to see if they experienced different transaction costs with order buyers than feedlots 
that primarily finished cattle.  The information gained from the backgrounding feedlot 
was not used in the final analysis because it did not finish cattle. However it was 
observed that the backgrounding lot received similar service from order buyers as did 
similar sized finishing feedlots. 
Appendix B provides the initial feedlot seed questions developed prior to the 
interview process.  The interviews were conducted under the University of 
Saskatchewan Ethics Committee guidelines. The questions were designed to determine 
the feedlots average fixed transaction costs and average variable transaction costs with 
order buyers and packing plants.  The order buyer transaction costs were adjusted to 
reflect differences in services.  Services provided by some or all order buyers include 
the acquisition of cattle, marketing of cattle, financing of cattle purchases and price 
information.  The value of these extra services was determined by asking feedlot 
managers that did not receive these services their costs of obtaining similar services. For 
example feedlot managers that did not receive significant marketing information from 
order buyers were asked their costs in obtaining similar information. Feedlot managers 
were asked to rate the quality of animals they received in order to determine quality 
differences.  Then the feedlot managers were asked questions designed to address fixed 
                                                 
27 One factor that was taken into account when making this decision was that other order buyers had been 
contacted to do interviews.  Only one returned the message and was willing to be interviewed.  Thus it 
was thought that getting a good cross-section of information would be difficult. 
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and variable search and information transaction costs for order buyers and packing 
plants as outlined in table 4.7.  Similarly they were asked questions on fixed and 
variable negotiating and decision making transaction costs as well as monitoring and 
enforcement transaction costs as outlined in tables 4.8 and 4.9 respectively.   
 
5.2 Feedlot Transaction Costs   
 
Two of the seven finishing feedlots were not included in the final results. One 
feedlot did not have sufficient information to include it in the results while another 
feedlot had significantly higher transaction costs.  This feedlot, hereafter referred to as 
feedlot Z, had a unique business relationship with its order buyers.  This business 
relationship resulted in low trust and lower services in terms of quality of animals and 
marketing information. The remaining five finishing feedlots accounted for about half 
of the finishing capacity in Saskatchewan.  
Many feedlot managers indicated that strong business relationships resulted in 
good communication between the feedlot manger and the order buyer.  They indicated 
that the order buyer needed to understand the type of cattle they want and that the 
feedlot manager could trust the order buyer to deliver these animals at a reasonable cost.  
So the feedlot managers trust depended on the skill of the order buyer to select the 
correct animals at the appropriate price range.  For example one feedlot manager said he 
did not care if he received poor quality animals as long as the price he paid reflected the 
quality. However another feedlot manager required cattle of a specific quality and could 
not accept animals of poor quality.  An order buyer would have a good business 
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relationship with these two feedlots if he understood the different requirements of the 
two feedlot managers and delivered cattle accordingly. 
Table 5.1 outlines the estimated transaction costs that the five feedlots incurred 
when purchasing cattle from order buyers. All feedlot managers had a good concept of 
what it would cost them if they were to lose their primary order buyer.  This cost 
included initial search and information costs (SI), negotiating and decision making costs 
(NI), and monitoring and enforcement costs (MI) plus any addition value the feedlot 
manger may put on their business relationship (ρmLu)28 (See equation 4.15).  Initial 
search and information costs varied from $0.00009 to $0.30 per animal with a mean of 
$0.06. Initial negotiating and decision making costs varied between $0.00009 and 
$0.003 per animal with a mean of $0.006.  Some of the initial negotiating and decision 
making costs were captured in the initial search and information costs.  The cost of 
setting up a monitoring system was between $0 and $0.02 per animal with a mean of 
$0.006.  
Many feedlots reported that it would take several months to develop or find 
another order buyer. These feedlots suggested the loss would be between $3 to $20 per 
head (true ρ) from 3 months and 2 years. The cost of losing the primary order buyer (α) 
accumulated throughout the life of the feedlot. It was assumed that the feedlot was the 
same size and made the same number of transactions throughout the period that the loss 
of business relationship (α) was calculated. Thus, the five feedlots accumulated cost of 
losing their primary order buyer varied from just under one dollar per animal to over 
$30 per animal with a mean of $8.94 per animal. That is the average feedlot would lose
                                                 
28 Table 5.1 reflects an average value for the loss of business relationship parameter (ρ ) based on annual 
transactions.  The true parameter varied throughout the life of the business and was based either on 
transactions or animals. 
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Table 5.1: Feedlot Transaction Costs: Buying Cattle from Order Buyers 
Cost Theoretical Model 
Symbol 
Range1 Mean1 
Fixed Cost    
Cost of losing buyer 
parameter  accumulated3   
 ρ 2 $0.89 to $30.31 $8.88 
Initial search SI $0.00009 to $0.30 $0.06 
Initial negotiating NI $0.00009 to $0.003  $0.001 
Initial monitoring MI $0.000 to $0.020 $0.006 
Cost of losing buyer3  
accumulated  
α=SI+NI+MI+ ρ $0.89 to $30 
 $8.94  
Stock of capital trust3 
accumulated 
K $7.20 to $140  $39.38  
 Average fixed trans. cost4 [α* npt /(1+K* npt)]/ npt  $0.0001 to $0.000001  $0.00006 
Variable Cost    
Search5 St $0 to $1.41 $0.28 
Negotiating Nt1 $0 to $0.30 $0.12 
Commission/animal6 Nt2 $5.50 $5.50 
Quality adjustment7 Nt3 $0 to 10.50 $2.66 
Monitoring buyers σct $0 to $0.20 $0.07 
Monitoring animal σnt $0.09 to $1.33 $0.66 
Ave. var. trans. cost8  [St + Nt1+ Nt2+ Nt3+ 
σct + σnt] 
$16.39 to $7.06 $9.30 
    
Ave. trans. cost- order buyer  AFTC + AVTC9 $16.39 to $7.06 $9.30 
 Source: Calculated from survey information. 
1Expressed in per animal terms based on the number of animals purchased during the current year in 
order to maintain confidentiality. 
2This is not the true parameters used in equation 4.15 rather it is the value accumulated over the lifetime 
of the feedlot expressed in terms of the current years animal purchases. 
3This is accumulated over the lifetime of the feedlot. It was assumed that the same numbers of animals 
were purchased throughout the life of the feedlot because it was not possible to get the exact numbers. 
4npt is the number of cattle purchased during the current year.  
5Search cost includes lack of market price discovery service from order buyers. 
6Here it is assumed an animal weighs 550 pounds based on 500 pounds for heifers and 600 pounds for 
steers and a 50:50 split. This number is expressed per animal. 
7 This was based on the feedlot managers opinion of the percentage of animals that were below his 
feedlots standard. All but one feedlot estimated their percentage of below standard animals at 0% to 
1.5% the other feedlot was adjusted down to 1.5% because it was thought its standards were too high.  
This percentage was then multiplied by the number of animals purchased annually at a cost of $70 per 
animal. 
8The averages do not add up because of rounding off numbers. 
9This refers to average fixed transaction costs plus average variable transaction costs with order buyers. 
 
about $9 for each animal it purchased throughout the year if its primary buyer were to 
quit buying for them. 
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To offset the risk of losing their primary buyers feedlot managers develop a trust 
relationship referred to as the stock of capital trust (Kt) with their order buyers. The 
stock of capital trust was viewed by the feedlot managers either as a straight linear 
function or a multi-stage linear function with decreasing returns over time.29 None of 
the feedlots felt the stock of capital trust should be discounted. There was no inflation 
adjustment because it was assumed that the feedlot managers gave their estimates in 
current dollars. In calculating the stock of capital trust it was assumed that the feedlot 
purchased the same number of animals annually and incurred the same number of 
transactions as it did during the time they were surveyed.  Obviously feedlots grew over 
time, however many feedlots were over 20 years old and had gone through changes in 
management.  So it was not possible to get an accurate number of animals sold annually 
throughout the life of the feedlot. The ongoing trust component parameter (β) varied 
from $50 to $1800 per transaction30. Thus the accumulated calculated stock of capital 
trust (Kt) varied from $7.20 per animal to $140 per animal with a mean of $39.38 per 
animal (see equation 4.16). 
The fixed cost then was the cost of losing the primary order buyer discounted by 
the stock of capital trust as outlined in equation 4.17. The average fixed cost was 
calculated by dividing the fixed cost by the annual animal purchases (similar to 
equation 4.22).  The resulting average fixed costs relating to order buyers for the five 
feedlots were insignificant.   
                                                 
29 Mathematically this would be expressed as VmVmVm vvvβββ +++ ...222111 where β is 
the value ascribed to the number of transactions (m) for a number of years (V) in each period (1,2,,v). 
30 These are the true parameters (β) not the ones listed in table 5.1 which are an average of the 
accumulated trust  (Table 5.1 footnote 3) expressed in terms of annual transactions. 
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Ongoing search and information costs (St) were due to price discovery.  Those 
feedlots with market information provided by order buyers did not incur any ongoing 
search costs. Thus ongoing search and information costs acted as one adjustment for 
services provided by order buyers and varied from $0 to $1.41 per animal with a mean 
cost of $0.28 per animal per year.  
Ongoing negotiating and decision making costs (Nt1) consisted of time spent 
determining price, quantity, type of cattle and delivery time.  For some this time 
included market information but it was not possible to separate out the time spent on 
gaining market information because this time varied during negotiations. Nt1 varied 
from $0 to $0.30 per animal annually with a mean annual expenditure of $0.12. 
Commission charges (Nt2) and quality adjustment (Nt3) were separated out from the 
time spent on negotiating and decision making costs.  
All feedlots paid $1.00 per hundred-weight as order buyer commissions. It was 
assumed that the average animal weighed 550 pounds based on an average heifer 
weight of 500 pounds and an average steer weight of 600 pounds. Thus, the commission 
fee is assumed constant for all feedlots at $5.50 per animal. But not all feedlots were 
able to obtain the quality of animals they wanted.  The quality adjustment cost was 
calculated assuming that the below standard animals would cost an extra $70 which 
included higher feeding costs and lower prices received for these animals when 
marketed.  It became clear that feedlots had different quality standards.  However, most 
of the feedlot managers felt the below standard animals they received were between 
zero and 1.5 percent.  Feedlot Z and another feedlot were significantly outside this 
range.  Further discussions with these two feedlots led the interviewer to conclude that 
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they had significantly higher standards.  So it was decided to set these two feedlots at 
the top of the range or 1.5 percent quality adjustment. Feedlot Z was later excluded 
from the analysis. 
Not all feedlots monitored their order buyers. Those that did not monitor their 
buyers already had developed a strong trust with them or felt that monitoring the order 
buyer was not practical.  Two of these feedlots had extensive monitoring systems that 
enabled them to make decisions on a myriad of situations.  For example one feedlot 
ranked its order buyers according to profitability. Clearly this extra information had a 
value but it was impossible to put a monetary value on it.  So there was not any positive 
adjustment made in the calculations to offset these extra monitoring costs for these two 
feedlots. This would result in their transaction costs estimates being higher than they 
should be. The cost of setting up a monitoring system (σct) was between $0 and $0.20 
per animal annually with a mean of $0.07. 
All feedlots monitored (σnt) their animals when their cattle came to the feedlot.  
This monitoring included visual inspection, weighing, tagging and other activities.  The 
monitoring cost was calculated based on the amount of time it took to do the monitoring 
multiplied by the wage rate. The cost of monitoring animals was from $0.09 to $1.33 
per animal with a mean of $0.66.  
The sum of ongoing search and information costs, negotiating and decision 
making costs, monitoring and enforcement costs, order buyer commission of $5.50 per 
animal and a quality adjustment accounted for the total variable transaction costs (St+ 
Nt1+ Nt2+ Nt3+σct +nptσnt see equation 4.20) for order buyers. The average variable 
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transaction costs were calculated by dividing the total variable transaction costs by the 
number of animals purchased (similar to equation 4.21). 
In a similar manner feedlot transaction costs for selling cattle were calculated for 
packing plants.  These costs are outlined in table 5.2. Some feedlot managers viewed 
losing a packing plant to be more important than losing an order buyer while others had 
the opposite opinion. The accumulated cost of losing the business relationship with a 
packing plant varied from $3 per animal to $350 per animal with a mean of $83 per 
animal.  The cost of losing access to the primary packing plant to most feedlots was 
more important than losing the primary buyer.  
Many feedlot managers cultivated business relationships with packing plants in 
order to reduce the risk of losing their packing plant.  They felt that it was important 
that the packing plant knew that the feedlot understood their quality requirements and 
that their feedlot could deliver cattle to meet these requirements. One feedlot manager 
took a tour of his primary packing plant and visited with the head buyer in order to 
improve relations.  He said this visit increased the price he received for his animals 
significantly and that the packing plant purchased almost all his animals compared to 
about half prior to the visit. Another feedlot manager shipped cattle to a packing plant at 
low profits until he was able to develop a stronger business relationship.  Most feedlot 
managers sold to the packing plant with the highest bid. So the packing plants that 
appreciated the quality of cattle which the feedlot supplied would offer the highest 
price. The stock of capital trust varied from below $1 to $3,260 per animal with a mean 
of $686 per animal. 
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Table 5.2: Feedlot Transaction Costs: Selling Cattle to Packing Plants 
Cost Theoretical Model 
Symbol 
Range1 Mean1 
Fixed Cost    
Cost of losing buyer 
parameter  accumulated3 
ρ2 $3.25 to $50.00 $17.42 
Initial search SI $0.00 to $325.00 $65.41 
Initial negotiating NI $0.00 to $0.22  $0.45 
Total cost of losing buyer3 
- accumulated 
α=SI+NI+ ρ $3.25 to $350 
 $82.88  
Stock of capital trust3 - 
accumulated 
K $0.71 to $3,260  $685.79  
Average fixed trans. cost4 [α* nst /(1+K* nst)]/ nst  $0.002 to $0.00000004  $0.0008 
Variable Cost    
Search St $0.00 to $0.18 $0.076 
Negotiating Nt $0.00 to $6.50 $1.336 
Monitoring5 σct+ σnt  $0.00 to $0.29 $0.098 
Ave. Var. trans. cost4 [St + Nt+ σct+ σnt]/ nst $0.04 to $6.69 $1.51 
    
Ave. trans. costs-packers  AFTC + AVTC6 $0.04 to $6.69 $1.51 
    
Total Average Transaction 
Costs7 
Order Buyer ATC 
+Packer ATC 
$7.52 to $16.67 $10.80 
 Source: Calculated from survey information. 
1Expressed in per animal terms based on the number of animals sold during the current year in order to 
maintain confidentiality. 
2This is not the true parameters used in equation 4.15 rather it is the value accumulated over the lifetime 
of the feedlot expressed in terms of the current years animal sales. Here feedlot managers were specific 
on the loss so no assumptions over the life of the feedlot were necessary. 
3This is accumulated over the lifetime of the feedlot.  
4nst is the number of cattle sold during the current year.  
5Monitoring costs for packing plants were combined. The cost of setting up a monitoring system was 
included in the order buyer fixed monitoring costs (table 5.1) because it was not possible to separate 
them. 
6This refers to average fixed transaction costs plus average variable transaction costs. 
7Sum of average transaction costs of order buyers and packing plants. 
 
In general feedlot managers who valued their packing plant or order buyer 
invested (in terms of lost opportunities or actual out of pocket expenses) in developing a 
business relationship with them.  Those who did not value their packer or order buyer 
did not invest much into their business relationship.   
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The average fixed costs of the feedlots were calculated in the same manner as 
with the order buyers. The average fixed transaction costs for the five feedlots again 
proved to be insignificant.   
The ongoing search and information costs (St) and negotiating and decision 
making costs (Nt) were calculated on the time spent doing these activities multiplied by 
the wage rate.  These costs varied between feedlots depending on how they marketed 
their animals and the level of trust they had with their packing plant.  Some feedlots 
paid a commission to sell their animals while others did not. The ongoing search and 
information costs were between $0 and $0.18 per animal with a mean of $0.08.  
Negotiating and decision making costs varied from $0 to $6.50 per animal with a mean 
of $1.34 per animal. 
Feedlots that put a high value on monitoring order buyers put a high value on 
monitoring their packing plants. One feedlot ranked packing plants based on a 
combination of factors such as payment time, delivery of animals, strength of their 
business relationship and ease of doing business. The strength of business relationship 
here refers to the amount of time the feedlot and packing plant had been doing business.  
A long business relationship was viewed to be more important than a short one.  Thus if 
both plants offered the same price the one who had a longer history with the feedlot 
would receive the cattle. The cost of setting up the monitoring system was included in 
the fixed monitoring costs of the order buyer (table 5.1) because it was not possible to 
distinguish between them. Therefore the monitoring and enforcement costs were related 
to entering information into the monitoring system and analyzing the results.  These 
costs varied from $0 to $7.50 per transaction with a mean of $4.95. 
114 
The average variable transaction costs for the packing plants were calculated in 
the same manner as the average variable transaction costs for order buyers.  The 
average variable transaction costs for the packing plants were between $0.04 and $6.69 
per animal with a mean of $1.51. 
The average transaction costs for finishing feedlots were the sum of the average 
transaction costs for the packing plants and order buyers.  Thus the average transaction 
costs for finishing feedlots varied from $7.52 to $16.67 per animal with a mean of 
$10.80 per animal. 
Marginal transaction costs were calculated similar to the specifications in 
equation 4.23.  The total transaction costs were calculated by taking the average 
transaction costs for the feedlot and multiplying them by the number of animals 
marketed annually (Nst).  This was necessary because not all the animals purchased 
were marketed as slaughter cattle. The marginal cost was then calculated by taking the 
derivative of the total transaction costs with respect to the number of animals marketed 
annually (Nst). 
These estimates can not be verified statistically.  The low sample numbers 
combined with the subjective nature of data collection makes statistical analysis 
impractical. Therefore these estimates should not be used as absolutes rather they 
should be interpreted as indicators of the importance of feedlot size in the buying and 
selling of cattle.  
The five feedlots were then placed into four categories.  The costs were 
averaged for the category that had two feedlots. The categories were based on the 
annual sales of finished animals.  
115 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the calculated average and marginal transaction cost curves 
for buying and selling cattle. The estimates are consistent with theory regarding 
increasing returns to size.  As size increases average costs decrease and marginal costs 
are below average costs.  The survey results were unable to find where average costs 
were increasing or where marginal costs exceeded average costs.  
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 Figure 5.1: Feedlot Transaction Costs: Buying and Selling Cattle* 
 *Quantity units were not included in this graph in order to maintain confidentiality.
           
Source: Calculated from survey information. 
  
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the average transaction costs for order buyers and 
packing plants respectively.   
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Figure 5.2: Feedlot Transaction Costs: Average Costs with Order Buyers* 
  *Quantity units were not included in this graph in order to maintain confidentiality. 
Source: Calculated from survey information. 
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Figure 5.3: Feedlot Transaction Costs: Average Costs with Packing Plants* 
  *Quantity units were not included in this graph in order to maintain confidentiality. 
  
Source: Calculated from survey information. 
 
 
5.3 Packing Plant Transaction Costs   
 
Interviews with the three packing plants resulted in some price information. In 
general the packing plant personnel agreed that business relationships and the size of 
the feedlot had an impact on the price paid to the feedlot.  However it was not possible 
to determine if this price information was due to transaction costs or market power.  In 
order to confirm this information it would have been necessary to determine the 
transaction costs each packing plant had with each of its supplying feedlots.  In theory 
calculating these costs are possible but it would be a mammoth undertaking which is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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Chapter 6 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
This chapter summarizes the main observations and findings in this thesis which 
is on transaction cost economics and its application to feedlot management and 
investment in Saskatchewan. The findings should be of value for those planning feedlot 
expansions in the province  
 
6.1 Summary 
  
The removal of the transportation subsidy on western Canadian grain has 
resulted in a relative shift in competitiveness from grain to livestock production in 
Saskatchewan.  Saskatchewan feedlot managers indicated that they fed cattle at a lower 
cost than their Alberta competitors.  They suggested their feeding advantage is in the 
range of $45 to $75 per animal.  Yet this supposed feeding advantage has not resulted in 
an increase in cattle being finished in the province.  In fact, statistics show that there has 
been a decrease in the number of cattle finished in Saskatchewan since the removal of 
the transportation subsidy. 
Historically, Saskatchewan has maintained a beef herd of approximately one 
million head.  However, from 1976 to 2001 the province exported over fifty percent of 
its feeder cattle to be fed elsewhere in North America.  Saskatchewan has retained from 
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30 to 50 percent of its feeder cattle.  The trend in the past fifteen years has been to 
export feeder cattle to Alberta then export barley to feed these cattle. 
However, Ramsay (2002) found that environmental concerns could limit feedlot 
development in Alberta.  She observed that water, manure disposal, and public 
resistance could act as restraints to feedlot development in that province.  She did not 
find that lack of feed supplies would be a limiting factor. 
Interviews with Saskatchewan feedlot managers suggested that lack of financing 
is a limiting factor to feedlot development in Saskatchewan.  They suggested that there 
are hindrances to investment in cattle feeding operations both locally and outside the 
province.  They indicated that one of the roles of the provincial government could be to 
facilitate better investment in the feeding sector.  In the opinion of feedlot mangers, 
investment would come into the province once land and labour laws were changed.  
They further indicated that there is a bias towards grain production in Saskatchewan and 
that feeding cattle is a high risk business which limits investment into the feedlot sector.  
These feedlot managers did not think that environmental concerns were an issue.  They 
did not feel that there was significant public resistance to feedlot development.  
However, there were mixed opinions among the feedlot mangers about the impact the 
provincial infrastructure had on feedlot development. 
Issues were also raised about the costs involved in buying and selling cattle.  
The interviews with the feedlot managers led to an investigation of transaction costs in 
buying and selling cattle at five finishing feedlots.  From this investigation, it appeared 
that the size of the finishing feedlot could influence feedlot development in 
Saskatchewan, where feedlots sell directly to their packing plants.  Thus, the prices they 
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receive from packing plants are likely impacted by the size of the feedlot and its 
relationship with its packing plant.  The prices that a new or developing feedlot receives 
for its slaughter cattle could also impact feedlot development. 
 
6.2 Conclusions 
 
Transaction costs are important in production economics.  Not quantifying the 
impact of transaction costs in production economics is akin to not computing the impact 
of subsidies in trade economics. The results of the empirical work show that feedlot 
transaction costs impact the buying of feeder animals and selling of fat cattle. Evidence 
suggests that larger finishing feedlots pay lower prices for their animals and receive 
higher value for their fat cattle than smaller finishing feedlots.   
This thesis shows that it is possible to quantitatively measure transaction costs.  
It provides both a theoretical methodology and gives empirical evidence of transaction 
costs for finishing feedlots in the purchase and sale of live cattle. 
The empirical results suggest that large finishing feedlots incur about $10 per 
animal lower transaction costs associated with buying and selling cattle compared to the 
small ones.  This implication is that a small feedlot pays a higher price for its business 
relationships with order buyers and packing plants.  For example a feedlot that sells 
about 3,000 head annually would incur greater transaction costs of about $30,000 
annually.  They would experience this cost until they grow in size. These costs do not 
take into account any lost price opportunity due to lack of size and experience. This 
could offset all or part of the feeding advantage that Saskatchewan feeders now enjoy 
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over Alberta feeders. Thus the existence of transaction costs act as holdup costs for 
establishing new feedlots.   
The empirical work indicated that the five feedlots examined had higher values 
for cumulative stock of capital trust in a business relationship than in the cumulative 
cost of losing that business relationship.   All the feedlots had a higher value for 
cumulative stock of capital trust with their primary order buyers and two had a higher 
value with their primary packing plants.  The two largest feedlots had higher cumulative 
stock of capital trust with their primary packing plants.  It would appear that the feedlot 
managers intuitively31 are developing strong trust relationships as an insurance policy 
against losing their business relationships.  If this is the case, then feedlot managers are 
more concerned with losing their business relationship with their primary order buyer 
than with their primary packing plant.  The exception is the larger feedlots which put an 
extremely high value on developing trust in their business relationship with their 
primary packing plant. Thus large feedlot managers would appear to place a higher 
value on their relationship with packing plants than smaller feedlot managers.  This 
would suggest that larger feedlot managers feel that they are getting significantly better 
prices from their primary packing plant.   
New feedlot investors need to be aware of the potential cost of developing a 
reputation.  These costs may be alleviated by partnering with an established feedlot and 
by obtaining management that has a positive reputation within the cattle feeding 
marketing chain. The size of the prospective feedlot is also an important consideration.  
                                                 
31 Intuitively in the sense that the feedlot mangers did not know their cumulative values for stock of 
capital trust and cost of losing their business relationship.  Feedlot mangers only provided what they 
thought it would cost them per transaction to lose a business relationship and what value they put on each 
transaction in gaining trust with an order buyer or packing plant.  
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Economies of size exist both in production costs and in transaction costs in buying and 
selling cattle.  These costs need to be compared with other transaction costs in 
establishing a feedlot such as feed supplies, environmental regulations and developing 
human resource skills in managing a large feedlot. The prospective feedlot should have 
sufficient financing to allow it to buy and sell cattle  
 
6.3 Study Limitations 
 
The theory of transaction costs economics was applied to the entire beef chain, 
from the cow/calf sector through to the retail sector.  However, the empirical work only 
examined one component of the beef supply chain-the beef feedlot sector.  In all 
likelihood, transaction costs impact other segments of the beef marketing chain as well. 
For example, to what extent do transaction costs impact the calf (stocker cattle) market 
in Saskatchewan?   
The fact that the empirical analysis was limited to five feedlots made it 
impractical to do any statistical analysis.  Thus, it is not possible to put any confidence 
levels on the transaction cost estimates which means that it is not possible to put any 
confidence level in the difference in transaction costs between large finishing feedlots 
and small ones.   
Another problem with the empirical analysis is that nearly all the feedlots 
examined, had over ten years experience in the finishing business.  Thus, it was almost 
impossible to determine to what extent reputation had on transaction costs.  That is, 
what are the differences in transaction costs between new finishing feedlots and 
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established finishing feedlots of similar size?  And if there are differences in transaction 
costs based on reputation, then how long does it take to develop sufficient reputation to 
offset these extra transaction costs and how rapidly does reputation develop?  
One shortcoming of the methodology used to determine fixed transaction costs 
is the use of the concept of the cost of lost business relationships as a proxy for the 
opportunity cost of a strong business relationship.  This concept applies well to large 
established feedlots.  However new small feedlots could underestimate the potential of 
their business relationships because they could not know what they are missing if they 
have never experienced it.  This would mean that they would underestimate their fixed 
costs which implies that they could have significant fixed costs and would incur 
transaction costs greater than the empirical results provided.  A better estimate of fixed 
transaction costs could be determined if it were possible to fully delineate the price 
differences that finishing feedlots received based on size and experience. 
Another problem with the method of calculating fixed transaction costs was with 
the calculation itself.  Equation 4.17 discounts the cost of losing a business relationship 
by the stock of capital trust gained in that business relationship.  This appeared to work 
well with established business relationships.  However, reducing the fixed transaction 
costs for new business relationships is another matter.  This method of calculating fixed 
transaction costs would likely underestimate the actual costs of newer feedlots. 
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6.4 Further Research Required 
 
Further research is required in developing the theoretical foundation in 
measuring transaction costs.  This thesis provides a starting point.  However, there may 
be better mathematical formulations that can be developed to underlie transaction costs 
estimation.  There are some difficulties, as pointed out earlier, on how, in this thesis, 
fixed transaction costs were calculated. But, the fact that calculating transaction costs is 
difficult should not hinder economists from attempting to calculate them. Dahlman 
(1979) points out that calculating fixed costs for assets such as land, buildings and 
equipment is difficult.  Yet this has not stopped economists from publishing a plethora 
of material on production costs.  When it comes to estimating transaction costs, 
unfortunately, as pointed out in the literature, there is an extreme shortage of studies, 
especially related to agriculture.  (This appears to be the first study on transaction costs 
in the beef industry as it pertains to Canada.) 
There needs to be further study into factors influencing the development of the 
beef sector in Saskatchewan.  This thesis only investigated the impact of transaction 
costs in buying and selling live cattle as pertaining to feedlots.  Transaction costs exist 
in many other areas of business relationships within the beef marketing chain.  For 
example, further research into the impact of transaction costs in obtaining roughage and 
grain would be an important area of study.  This could explain why feedlot managers 
prefer to own land to meet their forage requirements.  Another area of study would be 
how transaction costs can be minimized in switching from grain to beef production.  
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Finally, how can government programs minimize transaction costs in the Saskatchewan 
beef industry? 
The marketing channel approach developed in this study also raises the question 
of the competitiveness of markets and the choice of marketing outlets by various market 
participants.  It is our hypotheses, consistent with the recent study by Schmitz, Moss, 
and Schmitz (2003) in studying the sale of stocker cattle in the U.S., that firm size plays 
a major role in marketing outlets chosen.  For example, larger firms tend to shy away 
from public auctions in favor of private sales.  In so doing, they minimize both direct 
and indirect transaction costs.  They suggest that there is an urgent need to examine the 
efficiency of public auctions, not only from a direct transaction costs perspective but 
from an indirect cost viewpoint as well. 
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Appendix A 
 
Assessment of Western Canadian Beef Development project Questionnaire 
 
1) Please describe your operation in terms of size and anything else you would like 
to tell about your operation. 
2) How do you acquire your feeder cattle and feed? 
3) How do you market your animals? 
4) How do you reduce risk in your operation? 
5) What is your drought strategy? 
6) What is your human resource complement? 
7) In your mind, what are the reasons we have not seen significant feedlot or 
backgrounding development in Saskatchewan since the demise of the Crow? 
8) Some suggest that lack of local investment is a possible reason.  What is your 
opinion?  And if local investment is an issue, then why do you think there is a 
lack of local investment? 
9) Do you see hindrances for foreign investment (i.e. outside the local 
community)? 
10) Some say there is a lack of entrepreneurial attitude in the area and in 
Saskatchewan.  What do you think and if so why do think this is the case? 
11) Some say that local communities do not want to see any change near them, that 
is, they resist developments such as feedlots in their area. Do you think this is 
correct and if so how do you think attitudes could be changed? 
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12) Some say there is a lack of infrastructure in the region (roads and irrigations 
area).  Do you agree, if so how would you suggest changes be made recognizing 
provincial budget constraints and relatively low population base? 
13) Some suggest that the provincial government talks livestock development such 
as feedlots but has a grain mentality. Do you see any provincial policies that 
restrict developments in feedlots? What about federal policy?  What policies 
would you like changed or adopted and how would you like them to be 
changed? 
14) What role, if any, do you see government having in livestock development? 
15) Do you have anything else to add? 
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Appendix B 
Feedlot Operators Interview Questionnaire to Determine Transaction Costs 
(Eight of original seventeen re-interviewed) 
 
For Order Buyers 
 
1. What Order Buyers do you use? 
 
2. What Characteristics make a good Order Buyer? 
 
3. Why did you choose these Buyers? 
 
4. If you did not use X order buyer what would it cost you? ($ per animal or 
cents per pound live wgt..) 
 
5. How long did it take you to find the order buyers you liked (hours)? 
 
6. Average number of animals bought from each order buyer per year? 
 
7. Average number of animals bought each transaction with order buyers? 
 
8. No of contracts (formal or informal) per year? 
 
9. How did you settle on a price? (initially, on-going) 
 
10. How much time does it take you to settle on a price? (initially, on-going) 
 
11. How did you settle on how delivery is made? How long did it take to determine 
this? 
 
12. What is the value you put on the time spent to determine price and delivery? 
(Cost per hour) 
 
13. Do you track if the animals you purchase from each buyer to see if they are the 
ones you want? 
 
14. What percentage do you send back to the order buyer? 
 
15. What percentage of animals does not meet your requested standard but you keep 
anyway? 
 
16. How do you keep track of what animals come from which order buyer? 
 
17. How much time did it take to set up your tracking system?  
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18. Hourly cost for setting up tracking system? 
 
19. How much time does it take to track each transaction with an order buyer? 
 
20. Hourly cost to track each transaction? 
 
21. Over time do you track the order buyer more or less? What percentage change? 
 
22. Over time do you get better or worse cattle? What percentage change? 
 
23. Did your service overall from the order buyer improve or get worse over time? 
Percentage change? 
 
Reminder: Make sure you have determined some trust factor. 
 
For Packing Plants 
 
1) Who are your primary packing plants that you market to? (Give order of top two 
or three if available.) 
2) Average number of finished animals sold per year by feedlot? 
3) What would it cost you if X plant did not buy from you? ($ per animal or 
cents per pound) 
4) How did you set up your relationship with the packing plant(s) (top one-three)  
5) Average number of cattle sold each time/plant? (i.e. different lot sizes/plant?) 
6) Number of contracts (formal or informal) per year per plant? 
7) Total number or cattle marketed per year/plant? 
8) What characteristics make a good packing plant to sell to? 
9) How long did it take you to decide to sell to plant X? 
10) How long does it take to determine price? (initially, on-going) Cost per hour? 
11) How long does it take to determine payment? (initially, on-going) Cost per 
hour? 
12) Do you monitor the price and grade you get? 
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13) Do you have a monitoring system set up to see which plants give you the best 
price? How about receiving payment? 
14) How long did it take you to put together the monitoring system (hours)? 
15) How long does it take to monitor each sale [transaction] (hours)? 
16)  Does your monitoring increase or decrease over time? What percentage? 
17) Hourly cost to set up the monitoring system? Hourly cost to monitor each 
transaction? 
Reminder: Make sure you have determined some trust factor. 
 
 
